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The goal of randomness extraction is to distill (almost) perfect randomness from a weak source
of randomness. When the source yields a classical string X, many extractor constructions are
known. Yet, when considering a physical randomness source, X is itself ultimately the result of
a measurement on an underlying quantum system. When characterizing the power of a source to
supply randomness it is hence a natural question to ask, how much classical randomness we can
extract from a quantum system. To tackle this question we here take on the study of quantum-to-
classical randomness extractors (QC-extractors).
• We provide constructions of QC-extractors based on measurements in a full set of mutually unbiased bases (MUBs), and
certain single qubit measurements. The latter are particularly appealing since they are not only easy to implement, but
appear throughout quantum cryptography. We proceed to prove an upper bound on the maximum amount of randomness
that we could hope to extract from any quantum state. Some of our QC-extractors almost match this bound. We show
two applications of our results.
• First, we show that any QC-extractor gives rise to entropic uncertainty relations with respect to quantum side information.
Such relations were previously only known for two measurements. In particular, we obtain strong relations in terms of
the von Neumann (Shannon) entropy as well as the min-entropy for measurements in (almost) unitary 2-designs, a full
set of MUBs, and single qubit measurements in three MUBs each.
• Second, we finally resolve the central open question in the noisy-storage model [Wehner et al., PRL 100, 220502 (2008)]
by linking security to the quantum capacity of the adversary’s storage device. More precisely, we show that any two
party cryptographic primitive can be implemented securely as long as the adversary’s storage device has sufficiently low
quantum capacity. Our protocol does not need any quantum storage to implement, and is technologically feasible using
present-day technology.
Keywords: randomness extractors, randomness expansion, entropic uncertainty relations, mu-
tually unbiased bases, quantum side information, two-party quantum cryptography, noisy-storage
model.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Randomness is an essential resource for information theory, cryptography, and computation. However, most sources
of randomness exhibit only weak forms of unpredictability. The goal of randomness extraction is to convert such weak
randomness into (almost) uniform random bits. Classically, a weakly random source simply outputs a string X where
the ‘amount’ of randomness is measured in terms of the probability of guessing the value of X ahead of time. That
is, it is measured in terms of the min-entropy Hmin(X) = − logPguess(X). To convert X to perfect randomness, one
applies a function Ext that takes X, together with a shorter string R of perfect randomness (the seed) to an output
string K = Ext(X,R). The use of a seed is thereby necessary to ensure that the extractor works for all sources X
about which we know only the min-entropy, but no additional details of the source [88].1 Much work has been invested
1 Such as for example that each bit of a string X is chosen independently.
3into showing that particular classes of functions have the property that K is indeed very close to uniform as long as
the min-entropy of the source Hmin(X) is large enough.
Yet, for most applications this is not quite enough, and we want an even stronger statement. In particular, imagine
that we hold some side information E about X that increases our guessing probability to Pguess(X|E). For example,
such side information could come from an earlier application of an extractor to the same source. Intuitively, one
would not talk about randomness if e.g., the output is uniformly distributed, but identical to an earlier output. In a
cryptographic setting, side information can also be gathered by an adversary during the course of the protocol. We thus
ask that the output is perfectly random even with respect to such side information, i.e., uniform and uncorrelated from
E. Classically, it is known that extractors are indeed robust against classical side information [57], yielding a uniform
output K, whenever the min-entropy about X given access to side information E (Hmin(X|E) = − logPguess(X|E))
is sufficiently high (see [79, 88] for surveys). Especially with respect to cryptographic applications, we thereby again
want extractors that work for any source X of sufficiently high entropy Hmin(X|E) without any additional assumptions
about the source.
Recently, it has been recognized that since the underlying world is not classical, E may in fact hold quantum side
information about X [55, 75]. That this adds substantial difficulty to the problem was emphasized in [37] where it was
shown that there are in fact situations where using the same extractor gives a uniform output K if E is classical, but
is entirely predictable when E is quantum. Positive results were obtained in [57, 74, 75, 86], eventually culminating
in [30, 82], proving that a wide class of classical extractors (with relatively short seed) yield a uniform output, as long
as Hmin(X|E) is sufficiently large.
Yet, in a fully quantum world we might ask ourselves: where does X itself come from? How can we hope to harness
even weak sources to obtain surplus of classical randomness? Indeed, for any physical source hoping to create fresh
randomness, X is the result of a measurement on a quantum system A. That is, we can view the source as consisting
of in fact two processes: First, a quantum source emits a state ρA. Second, a measurement takes places yielding
the classical string X. Note that quantum mechanics does allow many different measurements on ρA, and hence the
question arises whether all such measurements are equally powerful at yielding a weakly random classical string X,
or whether some are more useful to us than others. As such, it becomes clear that when trying to study our ability
to extract randomness from any physical source, it is natural to ask how much randomness we can obtain from ρA
itself, rather than a particular classical string X.
The problem of extracting randomness from X alone is further complicated by the fact that it is typically very hard
to bound Hmin(X|E), when X is the result of quantum measurements on A, even if we know stringent bounds on the
quantum correlations between A and E to begin with. When E is trivial, entropic uncertainty relations [93] yield such
bounds when we are willing to average over a few randomly chosen measurements. A crude bound on Hmin(X|E)
can then be obtained by assuming that the size of E is limited. But even classically, it is easy to see that there
exist scenarios where bounding the adversaries’ knowledge simply by his memory size yields very weak bounds [58].
Another approach to bounding Hmin(X|E), common in e.g., Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), is possible in the
case when randomness is extracted from a state ρABE where measurements are made on both A and B to obtain an
estimate of Hmin(X|E) where X is obtained from A alone [2, 20, 21, 41, 69, 85]. Part of the state is thereby consumed
during the estimation process, which itself requires randomness. It is nevertheless possible to have an overall gain
in randomness. For example, it is known that if measurements2 between systems A and B lead to a so-called Bell
inequality violation, then E knows little about X [2, 20, 21, 36, 69, 70, 89]. This is exactly the setting of the recent
proofs [36, 70, 89] of [21, 69] where such violations were used to certify the creation of random bits using quantum
measurements as a black box. Clearly, making such an estimate is only possible in a special setting where the states
have a particular form ρABE , and we are given access to B and A.
A. Quantum to classical extractors
This leads us to study quantum-to-classical randomness extractors (QC-extractors). Our goal is to answer the
following question: how can we extract classical randomness from a physical source ρAE by performing measurements
on the quantum state ρA? In analogy to classical extractors, we thereby want to obtain randomness from the source
given only a minimal guarantee about its randomness - i.e. like min-entropy Hmin(X|E) for classical sources. It is
important to note that unlike the classical world, quantum mechanics does allow for the creation of true randomness
2 That satisfy the no-signalling condition.
4if we are given full control of the source and can prepare any state ρA at will.
3 However, we want our extractors to
work for any unknown source as long as it has sufficiently high entropy.
As opposed to classical-to-classical extractors (CC-extractors) given by functions Ext(·, R) mapping the outcome
of the randomness source to a string K, a QC-extractor is described by projective measurements whose outcomes
correspond to a classical string K. That is, a QC-extractor is a set of measurements
{M1A→K , . . . ,MLA→K}, where the
random seed R determines the measurement MRA→K that we will perform (see Section III for a detailed explanation
and a formal definition).4
When talking about quantum states ρAE , what is the relevant measure of how weak or strong a source is? To gain
some intuition on what the relevant measure should be, consider the case where ρAE is the maximally entangled state
between A and E. Intuitively, this is the strongest quantum correlation that can exist between two systems. It is
not hard to see that if we measure A in any basis to obtain some outcome X, and later communicate the choice of
basis to an adversary holding E, then the adversary can guess X perfectly. Intuitively, we would thus expect that the
relevant measure of how weak a quantum source is with respect to E involves a measure of the amount of entanglement
between A and E. It turns out that the conditional min-entropy Hmin(A|E) is exactly such a measure [56], and we
find that it is indeed the quantity that determines how many classical random bits we can hope to extract from A.
That this is rather analogous to the classical case is very appealing. However, unlike for classical A, Hmin(A|E) can
be negative if A is quantum (see below).
Note that in a quantum setting, we could also consider a quantum-to-quantum extractor (QQ-extractor). That
is, an extractor in which we do not measure but merely ask that the resulting state is quantumly fully random
(i.e., maximally mixed) and uncorrelated from E. Clearly, any QQ-extractor also forms a QC-extractor since any
subsequent measurement on the maximally mixed state has a uniform distribution over outcomes. As such a QQ-
extractor is stronger than a QC-extractor since we only require the output state to be close to uniform after performing
a measurement.5 Constructions for such extractors are indeed well known in quantum information theory as a
consequence of a notion known as ‘decoupling’, which plays a central role in quantum information theory (see [1, 32,
33, 43, 46, 47] and references therein). In general, a map that transforms a state ρAE into a state that is close to
a product state σA ⊗ ρE is a decoupling map. Decoupling processes thereby typically take the form of choosing a
random unitary from a set {U1, . . . , UL} to A = A1A2 and tracing out (i.e., ignoring) the system A2. For certain
classes of unitaries such as (almost) unitary 2-designs [32, 44, 80, 81] (see below) the resulting state ρA1E is close to
maximally mixed on A1 and uncorrelated from E, whenever Hmin(A|E) is sufficiently large. Measurements consisting
of applying such a unitary, followed by a measurement on A1 thus also yield QC-extractors.
6 Another example of
QQ-extractors are given by protocols that aim to distill entanglement between A and B from a state ρABE by means
of arbitrary communication between A and B. The resulting output state is uncorrelated from E and maximally
mixed on (part of) A. The state has the additional requirement that when measuring on (part of) A and B, the
resulting output bits are perfectly correlated (i.e., they form a shared key). States ρAB for which such a distillation
is possible are also called private bits [31, 48]. Note that given any QQ-extractor one could always purify the output
onto an additional system, say, B. Being mixed on A then corresponds naturally to being maximally entangled across
A and B underlining the close relation between randomness extraction, and entanglement distillation [5, 48]. Note,
however, that we do not want to assume special cases where we have access to other systems B in order to perform
such a distillation.
The authors of [9] also proposed a definition of quantum extractors that is indeed somewhat similar to a QQ-
extractor, however without any side information E. Our definitions (see Section III) impose two important require-
ments not present in [9, Definition 5.1]. Firstly, we require the output of the extractor to be unpredictable for any,
possibly quantum, adversary with access to side information E provided Hmin(A|E) is large enough. Secondly, we
consider strong extractors so that even given the seed R, the output of the extractor cannot be predicted. This allows
us to employ our extractor for cryptographic purposes. It also means that the output K together with R are jointly
close to uniform, meaning that we have effectively created more almost perfect randomness than we invested in the
3 For example, we could prepare the state |+〉 = (|0〉+ |1〉)/√2 and measure it in the computational basis, yielding a truly random coin.
Yet, this would correspond to controlling and knowing details of the source.
4 For quantum information theorists, note that one can of course use measurements to prepare states by measuring successively - however,
recall that we are interested in how much randomness we can obtain from an unknown source using a single measurement. The latter
is furthermore motivated by experimental situations where successive measurements are typically very hard to implement.
5 In quantum mechanics, it is possible to obtain a uniform distribution over outcomes even if the state was not maximally mixed. E.g.,
consider measuring the pure state |0〉〈0| in the Fourier basis.
6 For decoupling experts, note that the measurement map in a QC-extractor can be understood as a decoupling map. We would like to
emphasize though that our QC-extractor results do not follow from previous work on decoupling, and our measurements have many
nice properties not shared by unitaries used previously for decoupling.
5seed.
QC-extractors.
– We give two novel constructions of QC-extractors.7 The first one involves a full set of mutually unbiased
bases (MUBs) and pair-wise independent permutations (Theorem III.8). This construction is more ap-
pealing than unitary 2-designs because it is combinatorially much simpler to describe and computationally
more efficient, while having the same output size.
– Our second construction (Theorem III.9) is composed of unitaries acting on single qudits followed by some
measurements in the computational basis. We also refer to these as bitwise QC-extractors. An appealing
feature of the measurements defined by these unitaries is that they can be implemented with current
technology. In addition to computational efficiency, the fact that the unitaries act on a single qubit is often
a desirable property for the design of cryptographic protocols in which the creation of randomness is not
the only requirement for security. Our example application below (see also Section V) illustrates this.
– Finally, we also prove in Proposition III.6 that the maximum amount of randomness one can hope to
extract is roughly n+Hmin(A|E), where n denotes the input size. This upper bound can indeed be almost
achieved by means of, e.g., our full set of MUBs QC-extractor. We also establish basic upper and lower
bounds on the seed size for QC-extractors (see Table II).
The technique we use to prove that our constructions are QC-extractors is to bound the distance between the
output of the extractor and the desired output in Hilbert-Schmidt norm (using ideas from [10, 32, 33, 46, 47, 80, 81]).
For the full set of MUBs, this distance can even be computed exactly. We use the fact that the set of all the MUB
vectors forms a complex projective 2-design and that the set of permutations is pair-wise independent. For our second
construction, the analysis uses similar ideas in a more involved calculation. Our upper bound on the amount of
extractable randomness follows from simple monotonicity properties of the min-entropy. The upper bound on the
seed size follows from a non-explicit construction involving measure concentration techniques.
B. Application to entropic uncertainty relations
One of the fundamental ideas in quantum mechanics is the uncertainty principle. The security of essentially all
quantum cryptographic protocols is founded on its existence. Intuitively, it states that even with complete knowledge
about the quantum state ρA of a system A, it is impossible to predict the outcomes of all possible measurements on
A with certainty. In an information theoretic context it is very natural to quantify this lack of knowledge in terms of
entropic uncertainty relations (see [93] for a survey). Apart from their deep significance in the foundations of quantum
mechanics, entropic uncertainty relations are crucial tools in quantum information theory and quantum cryptography.
The most well-known relation is for two measurements M1A→K ,M2A→K and reads [62]
1
2
2∑
j=1
H(K)ρj ≥ log 1c , (1)
where H(K)ρj denotes the Shannon entropy of the post-measurement probability distributions ρ
j
K = MjA→K(ρA),
and c measures the overlap between the measurements. Note that for any quantum state ρA and measurements for
which c 6= 1, at least one of the entropies has to be greater than zero. In other words, it is impossible to predict the
outcomes of both measurements with certainty. Uncertainty relations are thereby called strong, if log(1/c) is large.
Just as extractors can depend on side information E, it is important to realize that also uncertainty should in fact
not be treated as an absolute, but with respect to the prior knowledge of an observer who has access to a quantum
system E [94]. As an illustration, recall the example from above where ρAE is the maximally entangled state. In
this case, for any measurement on A, there is a corresponding measurement on E that reproduces the measurement
outcomes. I.e., there is no uncertainty at all! In order to take into account possibly quantum information about A, one
needs to prove new entropic uncertainty relations that would have an additional term quantifying the quantum side
information. Unfortunately, up to this day, we only know such relations for two measurements [12, 19, 22–24, 73, 85].
Intuitively, uncertainty relations for two measurements are much easier to prove than relations for more measurements
7 That is, not following from results on QQ-extractors (i.e., from general decoupling theorems in quantum information theory).
6as in this case uncertainty coincides with another foundational notion in quantum information, complementarity. This
notion is relevant when we perform two measurements in succession and was an essential ingredient in the proofs.
However, it does not carry over to three or more measurements. Here, we prove the following results.
Uncertainty relations with quantum side information for more than two measurements. We show
that any set of measurements forming a QC-extractor yields an entropic uncertainty relation with respect to
quantum side information. We thereby obtain relations both for the usual von Neumann (Shannon) entropy, as
well as the min-entropy. The latter is relevant for cryptographic applications. This yields the first uncertainty
relations with quantum side information for more than two measurements. From our QC-extractors, we obtain
strong uncertainty relations for (almost) unitary 2-designs, measurements in a full set of mutually unbiased
bases (MUBs) on the whole space, as well as on many single qudits. The latter are the measurements used
e.g., in the six-state protocol of QKD, and are particularly relevant for applications in quantum cryptography
(see Table I for a summary of results for the min-entropy).
Note that uncertainty relations in terms of the min-entropy effectively help us to bound Hmin(X|ER), where R is
the seed for the QC-extractor (see Section IV for details). For example, for the full set of MUBs we prove that
Hmin(X|ER) & log |A|+Hmin(A|E) , (2)
where the output of the measurements is called X. Since Hmin(A|E) is negative when A and E are entangled, one
obtains less uncertainty in this case (as expected when considering the example of a maximally entangled state given
above). Of course, given such a bound, we could in turn apply a CC-extractor to the weakly random string X to
obtain a uniform K. This underscores the beautiful relation between the concept of randomness extraction from
a quantum state, and the notion of uncertainty relations with side information in quantum physics. From a QC-
extractor, we obtain uncertainty relations. In turn, from any measurements inducing strong uncertainty relations plus
a CC-extractor, we obtain a QC-extractor.8
C. Application to cryptography
Our second application is to proving security in the noisy-storage model. Unfortunately, it turns out that even
quantum communication does not enable us to solve two-party cryptographic problems between two parties that
do not trust each other [60]. Such problems include e.g., the well-known primitives bit commitment and oblivious
transfer [16, 18, 28, 61, 65], of which merely very weak variants are possible. How can this be when quantum
communication offers such great advantages when it comes to distributing encryption keys? Intuitively, the security
proof of QKD is considerably simplified by the fact that Alice and Bob do trust each other, and can collaborate to
check for any eavesdropping activity. For example, as mentioned above, when Alice and Bob share a state ρABE ,
where the eavesdropper holds E, they can use up part of the state to obtain an estimate of Hmin(X|E), where X is
a measurement outcome of the remaining part of Alice’s system.
Yet, since two-party cryptographic protocols are a central part of modern cryptography, one is willing to make
assumptions on how powerful the adversary can be in order to obtain security. Classically, these assumptions typically
consist of two parts. First, one assumes that a particular problem requires a lot of computational resources to solve
in some precise complexity theoretic sense. Second, one assumes that the adversary does indeed have insufficient
computational resources. However, we might instead ask whether there are other, more physical assumptions that
enable us to solve such tasks?
Classically, it is possible to obtain security, when we are willing to assume that the adversary’s classical memory
is limited in size [17, 64]. Yet, apart from the fact that classical storage is by now cheap and plentiful, the beautiful
idea of assuming a limited classical storage has one rather crucial caveat: any classical protocol in which the honest
players need to store n classical bits to execute the protocol can be broken by an adversary who is able to store
more than O(n2) bits [34]. Motivated by this unsatisfactory gap, it was thus suggested to assume that the attacker’s
quantum storage was bounded [25, 26], or, more generally, noisy [58, 78, 91]. The central assumption of the so-called
noisy-storage model is that during waiting times ∆t introduced in the protocol, the adversary can only keep quantum
information in his quantum storage device F . Otherwise, the attacker may be all powerful. In particular, he can store
an unlimited amount of classical information, and perform computations ‘instantaneously’. The latter implies that
the attacker could encode his quantum information into an arbitrarily complicated error correcting code to protect
8 Note that measurements plus a classical post-processing effectively forms a new, larger, set of measurements.
7it from any noise in F (see Section V for details). Of particular interest are thereby quantum memories consisting
of N ‘memory cells’, each of which undergoes some noise described by a channel N . That is, the memory device is
of the form F = N⊗N . Note that the bounded storage model is a special case, where each memory cell is just one
qubit, and N is the identity channel. To relate the number of transmitted qubits n to the size of the storage device
one typically chooses the storage rate ν such that N = ν · n. We follow this convention here to ease comparison with
earlier work.
Since its inception [91], it was clear that security in the noisy-storage model should be related to the question
of how much information the adversary can send through his noisy storage device. That is, the capacity of F to
transmit quantum information. Initial progress was made in [58] where security was linked to the storage device’s
ability to transmit classical information and shown against fully general attacks.9 Further progress was made only
very recently, linking the security to the so-called entanglement cost of the storage device [11], which lies between its
classical and quantum capacities.
Security and the quantum capacity. Here, we finally resolve the question of linking security in the noisy-
storage model to the quantum capacity of the storage device. More precisely, we show that any two-party
cryptographic primitive can be implemented securely under the assumption that the adversary is restricted to
using a quantum storage device of the form F = N⊗ν·n by means of a protocol transmitting n qubits whenever
ν · Q(N ) < 1 , and 2− log(3) . ν · γQ(N , 1/ν) , (3)
whereQ(N ) is the quantum capacity of the channelN and γQ(N , 1/ν) is the so-called strong converse parameter
of N for sending information through F at rate R = 1/ν. Note that the second condition actually does favor
small ν, since γQ(N , 1/ν) is large whenever the rate R = 1/ν is large. A similar statement can be obtained for
general channels F (see Section V for details and a worked out example).
We prove our result by showing the security of a simple quantum protocol for the cryptographic primitive weak
string erasure [58], which is known to be universal for two-party secure computation [58]. To this end, we employ
the bitwise QC-extractor for measurements of single qubits, each in one of three MUBs, known from the six-state
protocol in QKD.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Basic concepts
We briefly recount some important facts of quantum information, and establish notational conventions. A more
gentle introduction can be found in e.g. [58] or [66].
1. Quantum states
In quantum mechanics, a system such as Alice’s or Bob’s labs are described mathematically by Hilbert spaces,
denoted by A,B,C, . . .. Here, we follow the usual convention in quanutm cryptography and assume that all Hilbert
spaces are finite-dimensional. We write |A| for the dimension of A. The set of linear operators on A is denoted by
L(A). A quantum state ρA is an operator ρA ∈ S(A), where S(A) = {σA ∈ L(A) | σA ≥ 0, tr(σA) = 1}. If ρA has
rank 1 it is called a pure state. For technical reasons we also need the notion of sub-normalized states ρA ∈ S≤(A),
where S≤(A) = {σA ∈ L(A) | σA ≥ 0, tr(σA) ≤ 1}. We will use the term state to refer to sub-normalized states,
unless otherwise indicated in context.
Two systems A and B are combined using the tensor product, written as AB ≡ A ⊗ B. An operator on two
systems AB is thereby also called bipartite (and multipartite if the number of systems is larger). Given a bipartite
state ρAB ∈ S≤(AB), we write ρA = trB [ρAB ] for the corresponding reduced state, where trB is the partial trace over
B. That is, ρA is the state on system A alone.
9 Before [58], security was only shown under the additional assumption that the adversary attacks each qubit individually [91]. Whereas
this may sound similar to problems in QKD, note that the setting is entirely different when proving security between two mutually
distrustful parties, and security in QKD does not imply security in this model.
8It will be convenient to express classical probability distributions as quantum states. For some set X , let {|x〉}x∈X
be an orthonormal basis of the space X where each basis vector |x〉 corresponds to some particular element x ∈ X .
A distribution PX over X can now be expressed as
ρX =
∑
x∈X
PX(x)|x〉〈x| . (4)
We also call this a classical state or a c-state. In general, systems are called classical if they are of the above form for
some fixed standard basis, often called the computational basis. Naturally, one can now also consider states which
are classical on system X and quantum on some other system A. Such states have the form
ρXA =
∑
x∈X
PX(x) |x〉〈x|︸ ︷︷ ︸
X
⊗ ρxA︸︷︷︸
A
. (5)
We also call such states classical-quantum or cq-states. In general, when indicating that a multipartite state is part
classical, part quantum we will use c and q to label the classical and quantum systems, respectively.
2. Quantum operations
The simplest quantum operation is given by a unitary operator U taking ρ to UρU†. Later on, we will consider
applying unitary operators only to one part of a multipartite state. When applying U only to system A of ρAB we
thereby also use the common shorthand
UAρABU
†
A = (U ⊗ IB)ρAB(U ⊗ IB)† , (6)
where IB denotes the identity in L(B). More generally, for MA ∈ L(A), we write MA ≡MA⊗ IB for the enlargement
on any AB. Any operation allowed by quantum mechanics can be expressed as a quantum channel. The simplest
of these is the identity channel. For A, B with orthonormal bases {|i〉A}|A|i=1, {|i〉B}|B|i=1 and |A| = |B|, the canonical
identity mapping from L(A) to L(B) with respect to these bases is denoted by IA→B , i.e. IA→B(|i〉〈j|A) = |i〉〈j|B .
A linear map EA→B : L(A) → L(B) is positive if EA→B(ρA) ≥ 0 for all ρA ≥ 0. It is completely positive if the map
(EA→B ⊗ IC→C) is positive for all C. Completely positive and trace preserving maps (CPTMs) are called quantum
channels.
Indeed, also a measurement can be described as a quantum channel. Intuitively, a measurement takes a state ρ to
one of several possible classical measurement ‘outcomes’, where each outcome occurs with a certain probability. That
is, for some fixed measurement a particular state ρ determines some classical probability distribution over outcomes.
Recall from Equation (4) that we can express this distribution in terms of a quantum state. It will be convenient to
express this in terms of a quantum channel as the following measurement map, that we will need in Section III. For
a bipartite system A = A1A2, it is defined as TA→A1 : L(A)→ L(A1),
T (.)A→A1 =
∑
a1a2
〈a1a2|(.)|a1a2〉|a1〉〈a1| , (7)
where {|a1〉}, {|a2〉} are (standard) orthonormal bases of A1, A2 respectively. A small calculation readily reveals that
this map can be understood as tracing out A2, and then measuring the remaining system A1 in a basis {|a1〉}. Note
that the outcome of the measurement map is classical in the basis {|a1〉} on A1.
Throughout, we will need this measurement map to consider measurements of a specific form. These are formed
by first applying some particular unitary Uj to the state, followed by the measurement map TA→A1 . We denote these
measurements by
MjA→K1(ρA) = IA1→K1
(
TA→A1
(
UjρAU
†
j
))
, (8)
where the relabeling A1 → K1 accounts for the fact that the output system is actually classical (a notation that will
be very useful in Section IV on entropic uncertainty relations).
3. Distance measures
We will employ two well known distance measures between quantum states. The first is the L1- or trace dis-
tance, which is induced by the L1-norm ‖ρ‖1 = tr
[√
ρ†ρ
]
. The trace distance determines the success probability of
distinguishing two states ρ and σ given with a priori equal probability [45].
9The second distance measure we will refer to is the purified distance. To define it, we need the concept of generalized
fidelity between two states ρ, σ, which can be defined as [84],
F¯ (ρ, σ) = F (ρ, σ) +
√
(1− tr[ρ]) (1− tr[σ]) , (9)
where F (ρ, σ) = ‖√ρ√σ‖1 is the usual notion of fidelity. Note that if at least one of states is normalized, then the
two notions of fidelity coincide, i.e. F¯ (ρ, σ) = F (ρ, σ). The purified distance between two states ρ, σ is now defined
as [38, 84]
P (ρ, σ) =
√
1− F¯ (ρ, σ)2 , (10)
and is a metric on the set of sub-normalized states [84]. To gain some intuition about the notion of purified distance,
note that by Uhlman’s theorem [87] the fidelity between two normalized states ρ, σ can be written as F (ρ, σ) =
max|ρ〉,|σ〉 |〈ρ|σ〉|, where the maximization is taken over all purifications |ρ〉〈ρ| of ρ and |σ〉〈σ| of σ. Furthermore, note
that for pure states
√
1− F (|ρ〉〈ρ|, |σ〉〈σ|)2 = 12‖|ρ〉〈ρ| − |σ〉〈σ|‖1. Hence, for normalized states, we can think of the
purified distance as the minimal trace distance between any two purifications of the states ρ and σ. The purified
distance is indeed closely related to the trace distance, as for any two states ρ, σ we have [84],
1
2
‖ρ− σ‖1 ≤ P (ρ, σ) ≤
√
2‖ρ− σ‖1 . (11)
It is furthermore easy to see that for normalized states the factor 2 on the right hand side can be improved to 1.
For any distance measure, we can define an ε-ball of states around ρ as the states at a distance not more than ε
from ρ. Below, we will apply this notion to the purified distance and define
Bε(ρA) = {σA ∈ S≤(A) | P (ρA, σA) ≤ ε} . (12)
B. Quantifying information
The von Neumann entropy of ρA ∈ S≤(A) is defined as H(A)ρ = − tr[ρA log ρA]. Note that for a classical state ρX
this is simply the familiar Shannon entropy. The conditional von Neumann entropy of A given B for ρAB ∈ S≤(AB)
is defined as
H(A|B)ρ = H(AB)ρ −H(B)ρ . (13)
The conditional min-entropy of a state ρAB ∈ S(AB) defined as10
Hmin(A|B)ρ = max
σB∈S(B)
Hmin(A|B)ρ|σ , (14)
with
Hmin(A|B)ρ|σ = max
{
λ ∈ R : 2−λ · IA ⊗ σB ≥ ρAB
}
. (15)
For the special case where B is trivial, we obtain Hmin(A)ρ = − log ‖ρA‖∞, where ‖.‖∞ denotes the operator norm.
Whereas this definition may seem rather unwieldy, the min-entropy is known to have interesting operational inter-
pretations [56]. If A is classical, then the min-entropy can be expressed as Hmin(A|B)ρ = − logPguess(A|B), where
Pguess(A|B) is the average probability of guessing the classical symbol A = a maximized over all possible measurements
on B. If A is quantum, then Hmin(A|B)ρ is directly related to the maximal achievable singlet fraction achievable by
performing an operation on B, i.e. it is intuitively related to the amount of entanglement between A and B.
In practice, the full (operational) use of entropies only comes to play if one works with smoothed entropies.11 For
the conditional min-entropy this takes the form
Hεmin(A|B)ρ = max
ρ˜AB∈Bε(ρAB)
Hmin(A|B)ρ˜ , (16)
where the smoothing parameter ε ≥ 0 typically corresponds to an error tolerance in information theoretic operational
interpretations. For a more detailed discussion about smooth entropies we refer to [29, 56, 74, 83, 84].
10 We write max instead of sup as we work with finite dimensional Hilbert spaces.
11 Of course, this is not the case for the von Neumann entropy. But note that the von Neumann entropy usually only has operational
interpretations in an independent and identically distributed asymptotic setting. In contrast to this, smooth entropies allow the
quantitative characterization of general (structureless) resources.
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III. QUANTUM TO CLASSICAL RANDOMNESS EXTRACTORS (QC-EXTRACTORS)
The use of random bits is of fundamental importance for many information theoretic and computational tasks.
However, perfect randomness is not easily found in nature. Most sources of randomness only exhibit weak forms of
unpredictability. In order to use such sources in applications, one has to find a procedure to convert weak randomness
into almost uniform random bits. Such procedures are usually referred to as randomness extractors, which have been
extensively studied in the theoretical computer science literature; see [79, 88] for surveys.
In a classical world, the sources of randomness are described by probability distributions and the randomness
extractors are families of (deterministic) functions taking each possible value of the source to a binary string. To
understand the definition of quantum extractors, it is convenient to see a classical extractor as a family of permutations
acting on the possible values of the source. This family of permutations should satisfy the following property: for any
probability distribution on input bit strings with high min-entropy, applying a typical permutation from the family
to the input induces an almost uniform probability distribution on a prefix of the output. We define a quantum to
quantum extractor in a similar way by allowing the operations performed to be general unitary transformations and
the input to the extractor to be quantum.
Definition III.1 (QQ-Extractors). Let A = A1A2 with n = log |A|. Define the trace-out map trA2 : L(A) → L(A1)
by trA2(.) =
∑
a2
〈a2|(.)|a2〉 , where {|a2〉} is an orthonormal basis of A2.
For k ∈ [−n, n] and ε ∈ [0, 1], a (k, ε)-QQ-extractor is a set {U1, . . . , UL} of unitary transformations on A such
that for all states ρAE ∈ S(AE) satisfying Hmin(A|E)ρ ≥ k, we have
1
L
L∑
i=1
∥∥∥∥trA2 [UiρAEU†i ]− IA1|A1| ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
≤ ε . (17)
logL is called the seed size of the QQ-extractor.
We make a few remarks on the definition. First, we should stress that the same set of unitaries should satisfy (17)
for all states ρAE that meet the conditional min-entropy criterion Hmin(A|E)ρ ≥ k. In particular, the system E can
have arbitrarily large dimension. The quantity Hmin(A|E)ρ measures the uncertainty that an adversary has about the
system A. As it is usually impossible to model the knowledge of an adversary, a bound on the conditional min-entropy
is often all one can get. A notable difference with the classical setting is that the conditional min-entropy k can be
negative when the systems A and E are entangled. In fact, in many cryptographic applications, this case is the most
interesting.
A statement of the form of Equation (17) is more commonly known as a ‘decoupling’ result [1, 32, 33, 43, 46, 47].
Note, however, that decoupling does not always lead to the output being close to maximally mixed. Such statements
play an important role in quantum information theory and many coding theorems amount to proving a decoupling
theorem. In fact, the authors of [32, 33] showed that a set of unitaries forming a unitary 2-design (see Definition III.3)
define a (k, ε)-QQ-extractors as long as the output size log |A1| ≤ (n+ k)/2− log(1/ε).
A definition of quantum extractors was also proposed in [9, Definition 5.1]. Our definition is stronger in two
respects. Firstly, we consider strong extractors in that we impose a condition on the average of the trace distance to
the uniform distribution by contrast to the trace distance of the average. The weaker constraint used by [9] allows
them to construct quantum extractors with output size equals to the input size.12 Secondly, we require the extractor
to decouple the A system from any quantum side information held in the system E.
In the context of cryptography, a QQ-extractor is often more than one needs. In fact, it is usually sufficient to
extract random classical bits, which is in general easier to obtain than random qubits. This motivates the following
definition, where the difference to a QQ-extractor is that the output system A1 is measured in the computational
basis. In particular, any (k, ε)-QQ-extractor is also a (k, ε)-QC-extractor.
Definition III.2 (QC-Extractors). Let A = A1A2 with n = log |A|, and let TA→A1 be the measurement map defined
in Equation (7).
For k ∈ [−n, n] and ε ∈ [0, 1], a (k, ε)-QC-extractor is a set {U1, . . . , UL} of unitary transformations on A such
that for all states ρAE ∈ S(AE) satisfying Hmin(A|E) ≥ k, we have
1
L
L∑
i=1
∥∥∥∥TA→A1(UiρAEU†i )− IA1|A1| ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
≤ ε . (18)
12 In this case, the net randomness extracted is obtained by subtracting the randomness used for the seed
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logL is called the seed size of the QC-extractor.
Observe that Definition III.2 only allows a specific form of measurements obtained by applying a unitary transfor-
mation followed by a measurement in the computational basis of A1. The reason we use this definition is that we
want the output of the extractor to be determined by the source and the choice of the seed. In the quantum setting,
a natural way of translating this requirement is by imposing that an adversary holding a system that is maximally
entangled with the source can perfectly predict the output. This condition is satisfied by the form of measurements
dictated by Definition III.2. Allowing generalized measurements (POVMs) already (implicitly) allows the use of ran-
domness for free. Note also, that in the case where the system E is trivial, a (0, ε)-QC-extractor is the same as an
ε-metric uncertainty relation [35].
A. Examples and limitations of QC-extractors
Universal (or two-independent) hashing is probably one of the most important extractor constructions, which even
predates the general definition of extractors [49]. Unitary 2-designs can be seen as a quantum generalization of
two-independent hash functions.
Definition III.3. A set of unitaries {U1, . . . , UL} acting on A is said to be a 2-design if for all M ∈ L(A), we have
1
L
L∑
i=1
U⊗2i M(U
†
i )
⊗2 =
∫
U⊗2M(U†)⊗2dU (19)
where the integration is with respect to the Haar measure on the unitary group.
Many efficient constructions of unitary 2-designs are known [27, 39], and in an n-qubit space, such unitaries can
typically be computed by circuits of size O(n2). However, observe that the number of unitaries of a 2-design is at least
L ≥ |A|4−2|A|2 +2 [39]. The following is immediate using a general decoupling result from [32, 33] (see Lemma B.1).
Corollary III.4. Let A = A1A2 with n = log |A|. For all k ∈ [−n, n] and all ε > 0, a unitary 2-design {U1, . . . , UL}
on A is a (k, ε)-QC-extractor with output size
log |A1| = min(n, n+ k − 2 log(1/ε)). (20)
Similar results also hold for almost unitary 2-designs; see [80, 81]. Using [42], this shows for instance that random
quantum circuits of size O(n2) are QC-extractors with basically the same parameters as in Corollary III.4. We now
prove that choosing a reasonably small set of unitaries at random defines a QC-extractor with high probability. The
seed size in this case is of the same order as the output size of the extractor. We expect that a much smaller seed size
would be sufficient.
Theorem III.5. Let A = A1A2 with n = log |A| and TA→A1 be the measurement map defined in Equation (7). Let
ε > 0, c be a sufficiently large constant, and
log |A1| ≤ n+ k − 4 log(1/ε)− c as well as logL ≥ log |A1|+ log n+ 4 log(1/ε) + c . (21)
Then, choosing L unitaries {U1, . . . , UL} independently according to the Haar measure defines a (k, ε)-QC-extractor
with high probability.
The proof can be found in Appendix C. It uses one-shot decoupling techniques [10, 32, 33, 80, 81] combined with
an operator Chernoff bound [3] (see Lemma B.4).
We now give some limitations on the output size and seed size of QC-extractors. The following lemma shows
that even if we are looking for a QC-extractor that works for a particular state ρAE , the output size is at most
n+H
√
ε
min(A|E)ρ, where n denotes the size of the input.
Proposition III.6 (Upper bound on the output size). Let A = A1A2, ρAE ∈ S(AE), {U1, . . . , UL} a set of unitaries
on A, and TA→A1 defined as in Equation (7), such that
1
L
L∑
i=1
∥∥∥∥TA→A1 (UiρAEU†i )− IA1|A1| ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
≤ ε . (22)
Then,
log |A1| ≤ log |A|+H
√
ε
min(A|E) . (23)
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Proof. Consider the projective rank-one measurements {P ix} obtained by performing Ui followed by a measurement
in the computational basis of A. Using the fact that the min-entropy cannot increase by too much when performing
a measurement (Lemma A.4), we obtain for all i ∈ {1, . . . , L}
H
√
ε
min(A|E)ρ + log |A| ≥ H
√
ε
min(Xi|E)ρ , (24)
where Xi denotes the outcome of the measurement {P ix}. But condition (22) implies that there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , L}
such that ∥∥∥∥TA→A1 (UiρAEU†i )− IA1|A1| ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
≤ ε. (25)
By monotonicity of the min-entropy for classical registers [14, Lemma C.5], we have that
H
√
ε
min(Xi|E)ρ ≥ H
√
ε
min(A1|E)TA→A1(UiρAEU†i ) ≥ log |A1| , (26)
which proves the desired result.
The following simple argument shows that the number of unitaries of a QC-extractor has to be at least about 1/ε.
Proposition III.7 (Lower bound on seed size). Let A = A1A2. Any (k, ε)-QC-extractor with k ≤ log |A| − 1 is
composed of a set of unitaries on A of size at least L ≥ 1/ε.
Proof. Let S ⊆ [|A1|] be an arbitrary subset of |A1|/2 basis elements of A1. Then consider the state
ρA =
2
|A| ·
∑
a1∈S,a2∈[|A2|]
U†1 |a1a2〉〈a1a2|U1 . (27)
Note that T (U1ρAU†1 ) = 2A1
∑
a1∈S |a1〉〈a1| and thus ‖T (U1ρAU
†
1 )− IA1|A1|‖1 = 1. This implies the claim.
Observe that in the case where the system E is trivial (or classical), it was shown in [35] that there exists QC-
extractors composed of L = O(log(1/ε)ε−2) unitaries. This is a difference with classical extractors for which the
number of possible values of the seed has to be at least Ω((n− k)ε−2) [71].
B. Full set of mutually unbiased bases (MUBs)
We saw that unitary 2-designs define QC-extractors. As unitary 2-designs also define QQ-extractors, it is natural to
expect that we can build smaller and simpler sets of unitaries if we are only interested in extracting random classical
bits. In fact, in this section, we construct simpler sets of unitaries that define a QC-extractor. Two ingredients are
used: a full set of mutually unbiased bases and a family of pair-wise independent permutations.13
A set of unitaries {U1, . . . , UL} acting on A is said to define mutually unbiased bases if for all elements |a〉, |a′〉
of the computational basis of A, we have |〈a′|UjU†i |a〉|2 ≤ |A|−1 for all i 6= j. In other words, a state described
by a vector U†i |a〉 of the basis i gives a uniformly distributed outcome when measured in basis j for i 6= j. For
example the two bases, sometimes called computational and Hadamard bases (used in most quantum cryptographic
protocols), are mutually unbiased. There can be at most |A|+ 1 mutually unbiased bases for A. Constructions of full
sets of |A|+ 1 MUBs are known in prime power dimensions [7, 95]. Such unitaries can be implemented by quantum
circuits of almost linear size; see [35, Lemma 2.11]. Mutually unbiased bases also have applications in quantum state
determination [52, 95].
To state our result, we will need one more notion. A family P of permutations of a set X is pair-wise independent if
for all x1 6= x2 and y1 6= y2, and if pi is uniformly distributed over P, Pr {pi(x1) = y1, pi(x2) = y2} = 1|X|(|X|−1) . If X
has a field structure, i.e., if |X| is a prime power, it is simple to see that the family P = {x 7→ a ·x+b : a ∈ X∗, b ∈ X}
is pair-wise independent. In the following, permutations of basis elements of a Hilbert space A should be seen as a
unitary transformation on A.
13 The idea of using permutations with mutually unbiased bases goes back to [50] and was employed in [35] using results from [40].
Permutation extractors were used in a classical context in [72] and state randomization with permutation extractors is discussed in [35].
The decoupling behaviour of (almost) pairwise independent families of permutations is discussed in [80].
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Theorem III.8. Let A = A1A2 with n = log |A|, |A| a prime power, and consider the map TA→A1 as defined in
Equation (7). Then, if
{
U1, . . . , U|A|+1
}
defines a full set of mutually unbiased bases, we have for δ ≥ 0,
1
|P|
1
|A|+ 1
∑
P∈P
|A|+1∑
i=1
∥∥∥∥TA→A1 (PUiρAE (PUi)†)− IA1|A1| ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
≤
√
|A1|
|A|+ 12
−Hδmin(A|E)ρ + 2δ , (28)
where P is a set of pair-wise independent permutation matrices. In particular, the set {PUi : P ∈ P, i ∈ [|A| + 1]}
defines a (k, ε)-QC-extractor provided
log |A1| ≤ n+ k − 2 log(1/ε) , (29)
and the number of unitaries is
L = (|A|+ 1)|P| = (|A|+ 1)|A|(|A| − 1) . (30)
The proof can be found in Appendix C and uses one-shot decoupling techniques [10, 32, 33, 80, 81] together with
ideas related to permutation extractors [35, 50, 80]. Related theorems with the average taken only over a set of
pairwise independent permutations were derived in [80]. The idea is to bound the trace norm in Equation (28) by the
Hilbert-Schmidt norm of some well-chosen operator. This term is then computed exactly using the fact that the set
of all the MUB vectors form a complex projective 2-design (Lemma B.2), and the fact that the set of permutations is
pair-wise independent.
C. Bitwise QC-extractor
The unitaries we construct in this section are even simpler. They are composed of unitaries V acting on single
qudits followed by permutations P of the computational basis elements. Note that this means that the measurements
defined by these unitaries can be implemented with current technology. As the measurement T commutes with the
permutations P , we can first apply V , then measure in the computational basis and finally apply the permutation to
the (classical) outcome of the measurement. In addition to the computational efficiency, the fact that the unitaries act
on single qudits, is often a desirable property for the design of cryptographic protocols. In particular, the application
to the noisy storage model that we present in Section V does make use of this fact.
Let d ≥ 2 be a prime power so that there exists a complete set of mutually unbiased bases in dimension d. We
represent such a set of bases by a set of unitary transformations {V0, V1, . . . , Vd} mapping these bases to the standard
basis. For example, for the qubit space (d = 2), we can choose
V0 =
(
1 0
0 1
)
V1 =
1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
V2 =
1√
2
(
1 i
i −1
)
. (31)
We define the set Vd,n of unitary transformations on n qudits by Vd,n := {V = Vu1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Vun |ui ∈ {0, . . . , d}}. As
in the previous section, P denotes a family of pair-wise independent functions.
Theorem III.9. Let A = A1A2 with |A| = dn, |A1| = dξn, |A2| = d(1−ξ)n, and d a prime power. Consider the map
TA→A1 as defined in Equation (7). Then for δ ≥ 0 and δ′ > 0,
1
|P|
1
(d+ 1)n
∑
P∈P
∑
V ∈Vd,n
∥∥∥∥TA→A1 (PV ρAE (PV )†)− IA1|A1| ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
≤
√
2(1−log(d+1)+ξ log d)n(1 + 2−Hδmin(A|E)ρ+z) + 2(δ + δ′) , (32)
where Vd,n is defined as above, P is a set of pair-wise independent permutation matrices, and z = log
(
2
δ′2 +
1
1−δ
)
.
In particular, the set {PV : P ∈ P, V ∈ Vd,n} is a (k, ε)-extractor provided
log |A1| ≤ (log(d+ 1)− 1)n+ min {0, k} − 4 log(1/ε)− 7 (33)
and the number of unitaries is
L = (d+ 1)ndn(dn − 1) . (34)
The proof can be found in Appendix C. The analysis uses the same technique as in the proof of Theorem III.8. The
main difference is that we were not able to express the Hilbert-Schmidt norm exactly in terms of the conditional min-
entropy Hmin(A|E)ρ. Instead, we use some additional inequalities, which account for the slightly more complicated
expression we obtain.
All results about QC-extractors are summarized in Table II in the discussion section.
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IV. APPLICATIONS TO ENTROPIC UNCERTAINTY RELATIONS WITH QUANTUM SIDE
INFORMATION
The first application of our result is to entropic uncertainty relations with quantum side information. Entropic
uncertainty relations form a modern way to capture the notion of uncertainty in quantum physics, and have interesting
applications in quantum cryptography (see [93] for a survey). Intuitively, uncertainty relations aim to address the
following question. Let ρjK denote the distribution over classical outcomes K given by measurement j applied to
some particular state ρA. Consider now a set of L measurements that we could perform on some quantum system
A. What is the allowed set of L distributions ρjK for any quantum state ρA? Entropic uncertainty relations capture
limitations to this allowed set by bounding the entropies of such distributions. Typically, they are stated as an average
of entropies of the outcome distributions of the different measurements.
However, with regards to applications in quantum cryptography, it is important to realize that uncertainty should
not be treated as absolute, but with respect to the prior knowledge of an observer E. This has far reaching conse-
quences, as it comes to a subtle interplay between uncertainty and entanglement. The effect can be quantified by
uncertainty relations with quantum side information. Motivated by the case of two measurements [12, 19, 22–24, 73, 85]
(i.e. L = 2), such relations should tell us that for all states ρAE , we have
1
L
L∑
j=1
Hˆ(K|E)ρj ≥ c+ H˜(A|E)ρ , (35)
where ρjKE =MjA→K(ρAE), Hˆ and H˜ are some conditional entropy measures, and c is a constant depending on the
choice of measurements {M1A→K , . . . ,MLA→K}. Here the conditional entropy term on the rhs can in general become
negative and is a measure for the entanglement in the pre-measurement state ρAE . Of particular interest are thereby
the conditional von Neumann entropy, or (smoothed) Re´nyi entropies.
In the case of classical side information (E is a classical system), or no side information (E is trivial), many such
relations are known [93]. Let us now first consider this case in more detail in order to recall some basic facts about
entropic uncertainty relations. First of all, note that if Hˆ is the von Neumann entropy, one can use the chain rule to
express the l.h.s. of Equation (35) as
H(K|J)ρ = 1
L
L∑
j=1
H(K)ρj , (36)
where ρKJ =
1
L
∑L
j=1 ρ
j
K ⊗|j〉〈j|, with ρjK =MjA→K(ρA) being the classical distribution over measurement outcomes
when measurement MjA→K was performed on ρA. For other entropies we cannot simply rewrite the l.h.s. in this
manner, since no corresponding chain rule exists. Nevertheless, for most other interesting entropies, such as e.g. the
min-entropy, one can use the concavity of the log to lower bound
1
L
L∑
j=1
Hmin(K)ρj ≥ − log
 1
L
L∑
j=1
2−Hmin(K)ρj
 = Hmin(K|J)ρ . (37)
In fact, this and most other entropies uncertainty relations are typically proven by lower bounding Hˆ(K|J)ρ instead
of the average. That is, existing proofs actually give us
Hˆ(K|J)ρ ≥ c . (38)
We will refer to such a relation as a meta-entropic uncertainty relation. Meta-entropic relations are also the ones rele-
vant for most quantum cryptographic applications and have a foundational significance in quantum information [67].
Let us now return to the case with quantum side information. The goal of this section is to show that QC-extractors
lead to meta-entropic uncertainty relations with quantum side information of the form
Hˆ(K|EJ)ρ ≥ c+ H˜(A|E)ρ . (39)
A. Idea
Our approach of using QC-extractors to derive strong entropic uncertainty relations is based on ideas developed
in [35]. In fact, as outlined in Section III, one can understand the set of unitaries constructed in [35] as QC-extractors
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without quantum side information. As opposed to [35], we start with uncertainty relations for the smooth conditional
min-entropy, since this is the relevant operational quantity to bound for quantum cryptographic applications. We
first prove a meta-uncertainty relation which is essentially immediate.
Lemma IV.1. Let ρAE ∈ S(AE), and {U1, . . . , UL} be a set of unitaries on A with corresponding measurements{M1A→K1 , . . . ,MLA→K1} as defined in Equation (8), such that,
1
L
L∑
j=1
∥∥∥∥MjA→K1(ρAE)− IK1|K1| ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
≤ ε(ρ) , (40)
for some ε(ρ) depending on the input state ρAE. Then
H
√
2ε(ρ)
min (K1|EJ)ρ ≥ log |K1| , (41)
where ρK1EJ =
1
L
∑L
j=1MjA→K1(ρAE)⊗ |j〉〈j|J .
Proof. Note that since ‖ρK1EJ − ιK1EJ‖1 ≤ ε(ρ) with ιK1EJ = IK1|K1| ⊗ ρEJ , we have by Equation (11) applied
to normalized states that P (ρK1EJ , ι) ≤
√
2ε(ρ). It then follows immediately from the definition of the smooth
conditional min-entropy (Equation (16)) that H
√
2ε(ρ)
min (K1|EJ)ρ ≥ Hmin(K1|EJ)ι. Our claim now follows by noting
that Hmin(K1|EJ)ι = Hmin(K1)ι = log |K1|.
Uncertainty relations for the conditional von Neumann entropy can be obtained as follows.
Lemma IV.2. For the same premises as in Lemma IV.1, we have
1
L
L∑
j=1
H(K1|E)ρj = H(K1|EJ)ρ ≥ (1− 4ε(ρ)) log |K1| − 2h(ε(ρ)) , (42)
where ρjK1E =M
j
A→K1(ρAE) and ρK1EJ =
1
L
∑L
j=1 ρ
j
K1E
⊗ |j〉〈j|J .
Proof. By assumption we have ∥∥∥∥ρK1EJ − IK1|K1| ⊗ ρEJ
∥∥∥∥
1
≤ ε(ρ) , (43)
and hence the improved Alicki-Fannes inequality [4] immediately implies that the claim.
So far, we have merely made a few rather simple statements, and it is not easy to see how these uncertainty relations
should at all take quantum side information into account. This link is forged by the exact form of the approximation
parameter ε(ρ) for QC-extractors. We again start with the min-entropy case.
B. Uncertainty relations for the min-entropy
To get some intuition of how our line of proof works, let us now consider two simple examples in detail - bounds
for all constructions are summarized in Table I.
1. Exact unitary 2-designs
As an illustrative warmup, we consider measurements formed by applying a unitary Uj drawn from an exact unitary
2-design to A = A1A2, followed by a measurement of A in the standard basis leading to a classical outcome register
K. Denote this measurement byMjA→K . Note that we can perform the measurement in two steps. First, we measure
A1 to obtain a classical outcome K1. Second, we measure A2 to obtain a classical outcome K2. Let us first consider
only the outcome K1, tracing over the resulting classical register K2. This then corresponds to the measurements
MjA→K1 generated by the unitaries Uj (cf. Equation (8)) drawn from the exact unitary 2-design.
16
As outlined in Section III and Lemma B.1, the general decoupling results of [32, 33] immediately imply that the
set of such measurements forms a QC-extractor with
ε(ρ) = 2−
1
2 (H
δ
min(A|E)ρ+log |A2|) + 2δ , (44)
for any δ ≥ 0. Intuitively, ε(ρ) becomes larger if E is highly entangled with A and smaller if we trace out a larger
chunk A2 from the initial system. Let us suppose we would like to have an entropic uncertainty relation with respect
to quantum side information for some particular fixed ε′ = ε(ρ). Do there exist measurements that give us such a
high amount of uncertainty? Our results from the previous section tell us that such measurements do indeed exist, if
we choose A2 from the combined system A = A1A2 large enough. In particular, choose A2 such that
|A2| = 1
(ε′ − 2δ)2 · 2
−Hδmin(A|E)ρ . (45)
Using that log |K1| = log |A1| = log |A| − log |A2| we have by Lemma IV.1 and the monotonicity of the min-entropy
for the classical register K2 [14, Lemma C.5] that,
H
√
2ε′
min (K|EJ)ρ ≥ H
√
2ε′
min (K1|EJ)ρ ≥ log |A| − log
(
1
(ε′ − 2δ)2
)
+Hδmin(A|E)ρ , (46)
where ρKEJ =
1
L
∑
jMjA→K(ρAE)⊗ |j〉〈j|J . We set ε′ = ε2/2 and conclude that for any ε > 0 and δ ≥ 0,
Hεmin(K|EJ)ρ ≥ log |A| − log
(
1
(ε2/2− 2δ)2
)
+Hδmin(A|E)ρ . (47)
Note that since l.h.s. is in fact upper bounded by log |A| = log |K|, this uncertainty relation is very strong as long as
|A| is sufficiently large. To gain some intuition about this bound, consider the case of trivial side information E for
which Hmin(A|E)ρ = Hmin(A)ρ ≥ 0.
2. Full set of MUBs
As the second example we consider a measurement of A = A1A2 in the full set of |A| + 1 MUBs. As mentioned
before, it is known that whenever |A| = pk with p prime, such a set exists [7, 95]. As before, we denote the classical
outcome of measuring A = A1A2 with K = K1K2. Let us now first consider a post-processing of this measurement.
In particular, suppose that we randomly choose a two-wise independent permutation pi over |A| to obtain the string
Π(K1K2), and trace out a system of size log |A2| at the end. Let KΠ denote the resulting string. Note that this can
be understood as a new set of measurements. As shown in Theorem III.8 these form a QC-extractor with
ε(ρ) =
√
|A1|
|A|+ 12
Hδmin(A|E)ρ + 2δ , (48)
for any δ ≥ 0. To obtain a meaningful uncertainty relation, let us now again fix some particular ε′ = ε(ρ) and choose
|A1| accordingly. By rearranging the terms in (48) we obtain
log |A1| = log (|A|+ 1)− log
(
1
(ε′ − 2δ)2
)
+Hδmin(A|E)ρ . (49)
As above, one may now immediately write down uncertainty relations for the new, larger, set of measurements.
Intuitively, it is clear however that adding the additional permutation does not change matters - after all entropic
measures only depend on the distributions and are invariant under relabelings of the actual symbols. This can be seen
more formally as well by noting that Π(K1K2) can be computed from K1K2 and Π. We thus have for ε =
√
2ε′ > 0
and δ ≥ 0 that,
Hεmin(K|EJ)ρ ≥ Hεmin(K|EJΠ)ρ = Hεmin(Π(K)|EJΠ)ρ ≥ Hεmin(KΠ|EJΠ)ρ (50)
≥ log (|A|+ 1)− log
(
1
(ε2/2− 2δ)2
)
+Hδmin(A|E)ρ , (51)
where the first step follows because conditioning reduces the min-entropy [84, Theorem 18], the second from the fact
that Π(K) can be computed from K and Π [84, Lemma 13], the third from the monotonicity of the min-entropy for
a classical register [14, Lemma C.5], and the last one from Lemma IV.1 and Equation (49).
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3. Single-qudit measurements
From the point of view of applications, the following entropic uncertainty relation for single-qudit measurements is
probably the most interesting. It can be seen as a generalization to allow for quantum side information of uncertainty
relations obtained in [25].
Theorem IV.3. Let d ≥ 2 be a prime power. For any state ρAE, we have
Hεmin(K|EJ)ρ ≥ n · (log(d+ 1)− 1) + min
{
0, Hδmin(A|E)ρ − log
(
2
δ′2
+
1
1− 2δ
)}
− log
(
1
(ε2/2− 2δ − δ′)2
)
− 1,
where ρKEJ =
1
(d+1)n
∑
jMjA→K ⊗ |j〉〈j|J and the measurements MjA→K correspond to measuring each qudit in a
basis from a set of MUBs.
We summarize the various uncertainty relations relations for the min-entropy in the following table.
Lower bounds for the smooth conditional min-entropy Hεmin(K|EJ)ρ
Unitary 2-design log |A|+Hδmin(A|E)ρ − log
(
1
(ε2/2−2δ)2
)
Almost unitary 2-design log |A|+Hδmin(A|E)ρ − log
(
1
(ε2/2−2δ)2
)
− log (1 + ζ)
All |A|+ 1 MUBs log (|A|+ 1) +Hδmin(A|E)ρ − log
(
1
(ε2/2−2δ)2
)
Single qudit MUBs n · (log(d+ 1)− 1) + min
{
0, Hδmin(A|E)ρ − log
(
2
δ′2 +
1
1−2δ
)}
− log
(
1
(ε2/2−2δ−δ′)2
)
− 1
TABLE I: Entropic uncertainty relations with quantum side information for the smooth conditional min-entropy for approxi-
mation parameters ε > 0, ζ ≥ 0, η > 0, δ ≥ 0, and δ′ > 0. The almost unitary 2-design has an approximation parameter of
ζ
4|A|4 and can be sampled from using a random quantum circuit of size O
(
log |A|
(
log |A|+ log
(
1
ζ
)))
[42, 80, 81].
C. Uncertainty relations for the von Neumann entropy
Let us now turn to entropic uncertainty relations in terms of the von Neumann entropy. To this end, we again
consider the same two examples.
1. Exact unitary 2-designs
First, we again consider a set of measurements given by a unitary 2-design. Using (45) and the fact that log |K1| =
log |A1| = log |A| − log |A2|, we obtain from by the monotonicity of the von Neumann entropy and Lemma IV.2 that
for ε > 0 and δ ≥ 0,
1
L
L∑
j=1
H(K|E)ρj ≥ 1L
L∑
j=1
H(K1|E)ρj ≥ (1− 4ε)
(
log |A|+Hδmin(A|E)ρ − log
(
1
(ε− 2δ)2
))
− 2h(ε) . (52)
2. Full set of MUBs and single qudit MUBs
Similarly for the full set of |A|+ 1 MUBs, we get as in the min-entropy case that for ε > 0 and δ ≥ 0,
1
L
∑
j
H(K|E)ρj = H(K|EJ)ρ ≥ H(K|EJΠ) = H(Π(K)|EJΠ) ≥ H(KΠ|EJΠ) (53)
≥ (1− 4ε)
(
log (|A|+ 1) +Hδmin(A|E)ρ − log
(
1
(ε− 2δ)2
))
− 2h(ε) , (54)
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where the first step follows from the chain rule for the von Neumann entropy, the second from the fact that conditioning
reduces entropy, the third because Π(K) can be computed from K and Π, the fourth from the monotonicity of the
von Neumann entropy for a classical register, and the last from Lemma IV.2 together with Equation (49).
Glancing at both uncertainty relations, it seems rather unsatisfying that we have a mix of entropies. That is, on the
left we quantify information in terms of the von Neumann entropy, whereas on the right we employ the min-entropy.
Can we derive a relation solely in terms of the von Neumann entropy? As we prove in Appendix D this is indeed the
case, where we use the fact that the smooth min-entropy approaches the von Neumann entropy in the asymptotic
limit of many copies of the state (Lemma A.5).
Proposition IV.4. Let d ≥ 2 be a prime power, and {V0, V1, . . . , Vd} define a complete set of MUBs of Cd. Consider
the set of measurements {MjA→K : j ∈ [(d + 1)n]} on the n qudit space A defined by the unitary transformations{V = Vu1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Vun |ui ∈ {0, . . . , d}}. Then for all ρAE ∈ S(AE), we have
1
(d+ 1)n
(d+1)n∑
j=1
H(K|E)ρj ≥ n · (log(d+ 1)− 1) + min {0, H(A|E)ρ} , (55)
where ρj =MjA→K(ρ).
Note that for n = 1, this again gives an uncertainty relation for the full set of MUBs, but now a ‘complete’ von
Neumann entropy version
1
d+ 1
d+1∑
j=1
H(K|E)ρj ≥ log(d+ 1)− 1 + min {0, H(A|E)ρ} . (56)
To understand this bound it is again instructive to consider some special cases. Note that for E trivial, we arrive at
1
d+ 1
d+1∑
j=1
H(K)ρj ≥ log(d+ 1)− 1 , (57)
which is the best known bound for a full set of MUBs and general d [51, 76]. But it is also known that without side
information and d even, this can be improved to [77]
1
d+ 1
d+1∑
j=1
H(K)ρj ≥ 1d+ 1
(
d
2
log
(
d
2
)
+
(
d
2
+ 1
)
log
(
d
2
+ 1
))
. (58)
For one qubit (d = 2) the latter gives 2/3 (which is known to be tight, e.g. for the Pauli matrices), whereas our bound
gives log 3− 1 ≈ 0.585.
D. Conclusions
Previously, uncertainty relations with quantum side information were only known for two measurements [12, 19, 22–
24, 73, 85]. As shown above, however, any QC-extractor yields an uncertainty relation that takes quantum side
information into account. Tables I summarizes the uncertainty relations for the min-entropy obtained for the particular
QC-extractors from this paper. For the von Neumann entropy uncertainty relations, we would mainly like to point
to Proposition IV.4 and Equation (56), which can be understood as the generalization of a well known entropic
uncertainty relation without quantum side information (Equation (57)).
V. APPLICATIONS TO SECURITY IN THE NOISY-STORAGE MODEL
As the second application, we solve the long standing question of relating the security of cryptographic protocols
in the noisy-storage model [58, 78, 90, 91] to the quantum capacity.
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A. Model
Let us first provide a brief summary of the noisy-storage model - details can be found in [58]. The central assumption
of the model is that during waiting times ∆t introduced into the protocol, the adversary can only store quantum
information using a limited and unreliable quantum memory device. This is indeed the only assumption on the
adversary who is otherwise all powerful. In particular, he can store an unlimited amount of classical information,
and perform any operation instantaneously. The latter implies that he is able to perform any encoding and decoding
operations before and after using his memory device, even if these may be difficult to perform.
Mathematically, such a quantum storage device is simply a quantum channel F : B(Hin)→ B(Hout) mapping input
states on the space Hin to some noisy output states on the space Hout. Of particular interest are thereby input spaces
of the form Hin = (Cd)⊗N and channels F = N⊗N with N : B(Hin)→ B(Hout). This corresponds to a memory device
consisting of N d-dimensional ‘memory cells’ each of which experiences a noise described by the channel N . A special
case of this model is thus the bounded quantum storage model where d = 2, and F = I2 is the one qubit identity
channel [25, 26]. For a protocol using BB84 encoded qubits it is known that security can be achieved whenever N is
strictly less than half the number of qubits sent during the course of the protocol [58].
B. Security of existing protocols
1. Weak string erasure
How can we hope to show security in such a model? In [58] it was shown that bit commitment and oblivious
transfer, and hence any two-party secure computation [53], can be implemented securely against an all-powerful
quantum adversary given access to a much simpler primitive called weak string erasure (WSE). The latter primitive
was then proven secure in the noisy-storage model. It is hence enough to prove the security of WSE, and we will
follow this approach here.
The motivation behind the primitive weak string erasure was to create a basic quantum protocol that builds
up classical correlations between Alice and Bob which are later used to implement more interesting cryptographic
primitives. Informally, weak string erasure achieves the following task - a formal definition [58, 63] can be found
in the appendix. WSE takes no inputs from Alice and Bob. Alice receives as output a randomly chosen string
Xn = X1, . . . , Xn ∈ {0, 1}n. Bob receives a randomly chosen subset I ∈ [n] and the substring XI of Xn. Randomly
chosen thereby means that each index i ∈ [n] has some fixed probability p of being in I. Originally, p = 1/2 [58],
but any probability 0 < p < 1 allows for the implementation of oblivious transfer [63]. The security requirements of
weak string erasure are that Alice does not learn I, and Bob’s min-entropy given all of his information B is bounded
as Hmin(X|B) ≥ λn for some parameter λ > 0. To summarize all relevant parameters, we thereby speak of an
(n, λ, ε, p)-WSE scheme.
2. Protocol for weak string erasure
We now construct a very simple protocol for weak string erasure, and prove its security using our bitwise QC-
randomness extractor. The only difference to the protocol proposed in [58] is that we will use 3 MUBs per qubit
instead of only 2. For sake of argument, we state the protocol in a purified form where Alice generates EPR-pairs
and later measures them. Note, however, that the protocol is entirely equivalent to Alice creating single qubits and
sending them directly to Bob. In the purified protocol, the choice of bit she encodes is determined randomly by her
measurement outcome in the chosen basis on the EPR-pair. That is, honest Alice and Bob do not need any quantum
memory to implement the protocol below. Indeed, this is the way such protocols are typically implemented in practice.
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Protocol Weak string erasure (WSE): Outputs: xn ∈ {0, 1}n to Alice, (I, z|I|) ∈ 2[n] × {0, 1}|I| to Bob.
1. Alice: Creates n EPR-pairs Φ, and sends half of each pair to Bob.
2. Alice: Chooses a bases-specifying string θn ∈R {0, 1, 2}n uniformly at random. For all i, she measures the
i-th qubit in the basis θi to obtain outcome xi.
3. Bob: Chooses a basis string θ˜n ∈R {0, 1, 2}n uniformly at random. When receiving the i-th qubit, Bob
measures it in the basis given by θ˜i to obtain outcome x˜i.
Both parties wait time ∆t.
4. Alice: Sends the basis information θn to Bob, and outputs xn.
5. Bob: Computes I = {i ∈ [n] | θi = θ˜i}, and outputs (I, z|I|) := (I, x˜I).
The proof of correctness of the protocol, and security against dishonest Alice is identical to [58, 63]. It essentially
follows from the fact that Bob never sends any information to Alice. The main difficulty lies in proving security
against dishonest Bob. Before embarking on a formal proof, let us first consider the general form that any attack of
Bob takes (see Figure 1). First of all, note that the noisy-storage model only assumes that Bob has to use his storage
device during waiting times ∆t. That is, when attacking the protocol above he can in fact store the incoming qubits
perfectly until the waiting time, i.e., until all n qubits arrived. Let Q denote Bob’s quantum register containing all n
qubits. Note that since there is no communication between Alice and Bob during the transmission of these n qubits,
we can without loss of generality assume that Bob first waits for all n qubits to arrive before mounting any form of
attack.
As any operation in quantum theory is a quantum channel, Bob’s attack can also be described by a quantum
channel E : S≤(Q)→ S≤(Hin ⊗M). This map takes Q, to some quantum state on the input of Bob’s storage device
(Hin), and some arbitrarily large amount of classical information (M). For example, E could be an encoding into an
error-correcting code. By assumption of the noisy-storage model, Bob’s quantum memory is then affected by noise
F : S≤(Hin)→ S≤(Hout). After the waiting time, the joint state held by Alice and Bob in the purified version of the
protocol, i.e., before Alice measures, is thus of the form
ρABM = IA ⊗ [(F ⊗ IM ) ◦ E ] (Φ⊗n) , (59)
where Φ is an EPR-pair. After the waiting time, Bob can perform any form of quantum operation to try and recover
information from the storage device. Note that in principle, Bob’s goal is to recover X alone for which he could
potentially use his basis information Θ. Yet, we will see in Section V C that we can ignore the basis information in
the analysis. That is, we only need to analyze decoding maps D : S≤(Hin⊗M)→ S≤(Q′) trying to recover the initial
entanglement between Alice and Bob.
C. Security and the quantum capacity
Recall from the definition above that our goal is to show that Hεmin(X|BMΘ)ρ ≥ λ · n for some parameter λ. How
could we hope to accomplish this? Although it was always clear that security should be related to the channel’s ability
to store quantum information, i.e., the quantum capacity of F , proving this fact has long formed an elusive problem.
Partial progress to answering this question was made in [58] and [11], where security was linked to the classical
capacity and entanglement cost of F , respectively. Why would this problem be difficult? Note that we wish to make
a statement about some classical information X obtained by measuring A in bases Θ. That is, we effectively ask for
an uncertainty relation for said measurements. Previously, however, suitable uncertainty relations were only known
for classical side information. The missing ingredient is thus an uncertainty relation with quantum side information,
linked to the channel’s ability to preserve quantum information.
Indeed, one application of our QC-extractors is to provide such a relation, where for the protocol above we will
need the relation for 3 MUBs per qubit given in Table I. For E = BM on ρABMΘ it reads
Hεmin(X|BMΘ)ρ & (log(3)− 1)n+ min{0, Hmin(A|BM)ρ} . (60)
Note that the operational definition of the smooth conditional min-entropy already incorporates any guessing attack
Bob may mount on BMΘ. Clearly, not all QC-extractors are useful for protocols such as the above, as we must
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FIG. 1: Any attack of dishonest Bob is described by an encoding attack E and a ‘guessing’ attack, since for classical X the
min-entropy Hmin(X|BMΘ) is directly related to the probability that Bob guesses X. As we will see below, it is however
sufficient to consider how well a decoding attack D can preserve entanglement between Alice and Bob, where D acts on BM
on the state ρABM from Equation (59) at the marked point in time.
ensure that there exists a strategy for the honest players to succeed. However, any bitwise QC-extractor will do. How
can we now relate this expression to the quantum capacity? Note that the min-entropy has an appealing operational
interpretation [56] as
Hmin(A|BM)ρ = − log |A| max
ΛBM→A′
F (ΦAA′ , IA ⊗ Λ(ρABM )) , (61)
where ΦAA′ is the maximally entangled state accross AA
′. That is, the min-entropy is directly related to the
‘amount’ of entanglement between A and E = BM . To place a bound on (60), we would like to obtain a lower
bound on
min
E
Hmin(A|BM)ρ , (62)
where the minimization is taken over all encoding attacks described above. Note that this expression does not depend
on the basis information Θ, and that the map Λ in (61) can be understood as a decoding attack D aiming to restore
entanglement with Alice. Further, note that |A′| = |Q| and we can equivalently upper bound
max
D,E
F (ΦAB , IA ⊗ [D ◦ (F ⊗ IM ) ◦ E ] (ΦAQ)) = maxD,E Fc(D ◦ (F ⊗ IM ) ◦ E) . (63)
The quantity Fc on the r.h.s., however, is precisely the channel fidelity [8] of D ◦ (F ⊗ IM ) ◦ E , maximized over all
encodings and decodings where we are allowed free forward classical communication (M).
Why is this quantity interesting? When talking about a channel’s ability to carry information, we need to agree
on what it means to send information reliably. The channel fidelity is one of the measures in which the quantum
capacity can be expressed [59]. For the storage device F , the quantity
n = max log |A| (64)
s.t.max
D,E
Fc(D ◦ (F ⊗ IM ) ◦ E) ≥ 1− ε , (65)
tells us how much entanglement, or equivalently how many qubits [8], we can send through F with an error of at
most ε, using free feed forward classical communication (M). For ε→ 0, this quantity is also known as the one-shot
quantum capacity Q(1)→ of F itself, no matter what form F takes.
Let us now consider storage devices of the form F = N⊗N . Recall that the capacity of the channel N is the
maximum rate R = n/N at which we can send n (qu)bits reliably by using the channel N N times. For channels
22
F = N⊗N , the quantity R = n/N with n from Equation (64) thus determines the maximum rate at which we can send
information with error ε for any finite N . The usual quantum capacity with classical feed forward communication
Q→(N ) is then given by taking the limit N →∞ and ε→ 0.
Whereas one might think that forward classical communication helps, it is in fact known that it does not affect
the quantum capacity since for any scheme that achieves error ε using classical forward communication, there exists
a scheme without any classical communication with error at most 2ε [8]. Note that there are several definitions of
the quantum capacity using e.g. the entanglement fidelity or the distance from the identity channel in diamond norm
as a measure of success, however, all such definitions lead to the same capacity [59]. Combining Equation (60) and
Equation (63) thus finally relates the security in the noisy-storage model to the quantum capacity Q→(N ) of the
storage device.14
D. Security parameters from a strong converse
How can we now obtain explicit security parameters from this? We first make a statement analogous to [58,
Theorem III.2.i] for arbitrary channels F .
Theorem V.1. Let Bob’s storage device be given by F . For any choice of constant parameters ε, δ′ > 0, Protocol 1
implements (n, λ, ε, 1/3)-WSE with
λ = log(3)− 1− 1
n
max
{
0,max
D,E
log 2nFc(D ◦ (F ⊗ IM ) ◦ E) + κ
}
− 1
n
(ξ + 1) , (66)
where κ = log
(
2/δ′2 + 1
)
and ξ = log
(
1/
(
ε2/2− δ′)2).
Proof. The proof of correctness of the protocol, and security against dishonest Alice is identical to [58, 63] and does
not lead to any error terms. As shown in Section IV, any QC-extractor yields an entropic uncertainty relation with
quantum side information. For the case of 3 MUBs per qubit as in the protocol above, this uncertainty relation (see
Table I with δ = 0) is given by
Hεmin(X|BMΘ)ρ ≥ n · (log(3)− 1) + min {0, Hmin(A|BM)ρ − κ} − ξ − 1 . (67)
Note that any decoding attack of Bob is absorbed into the operational interpretation of the min-entropy. As outlined
above, it also follows from the operational interpretation of the min-entropy that for any encoding E and decoding D
attack of Bob
Hmin(A|BM)ρ ≥ − log 2nFc(D ◦ (F ⊗ IM ) ◦ E) . (68)
Together with Equation (67) this yields our claim.
Second, we consider a case of practical interest, i.e., channels of the form F = N⊗N . Let us first establish some
basic limits to security in this case. Note that for rates R ≤ Q→(N ), we have from Equation (64) that information
can be sent reliably. That is, cheating Bob is able to store the transmitted qubits perfectly whenever Alice sends less
than n = RN ≤ Q→(N )N qubits. Note that
R =
1
ν
, (69)
and thus in terms of the storage rate ν this condition reads 1 ≤ Q→(N ) · ν. Clearly, security cannot be obtained in
this case.
14 Note that this also relates security to the one-shot capacity Q
(1)
→ (F) of an arbitrary channel F .
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1. Strong converse parameter
But what happens for R > Q→(N )? A weak converse for the quantum capacity states that for any encoding E and
decoding scheme D, the channel fidelity is bounded away from 1. A strong converse states that for any encoding and
decoding scheme
Fc(D ◦ (F ⊗ IM ) ◦ E) ≤ 2−γQ(N ,R)·N , (70)
where γQ(N , R) > 0 is the strong converse parameter of the channel N at rate R. We are now ready to make a
formal statement of security. For this special case we obtain the following corollary by combining Theorem V.1,
Equation (70) and N = ν · n.
Corollary V.2. Let Bob’s storage device be of the form F = N⊗νn with ν ·Q→(N ) < 1 and either ν · γQ(N , 1/ν) >
2 − log(3) or ν · γQ(N , 1/ν) < 1 + κ/n. For any choice of constant parameters ε, δ′ > 0, Protocol 1 implements
(n, λ, ε, 1/3)-WSE with
λ = log(3)− 1−max
{
0, ν · γQ(N , 1/ν)− 1− κ
n
}
− 1
n
(ξ + 1) , (71)
where κ = log
(
2/δ′2 + 1
)
and ξ = log
(
1/
(
ε2/2− δ′)2).
Note that at first glance, the condition ν · γQ(N , R) > 2 − log(3) seems to favor large ν. However, note that γQ
will be larger if the rate R = 1/ν at which we send information is higher. An illustrative example is provided below.
Given Q→(N ) and γQ(N , R) we can thus in principle apply the theorem above to evaluate security parameters for
any choice of N . Yet, it should be emphasized that determining the quantum capacity of a channel is in general a very
hard problem. Indeed, with the exception of so-called degradable channels, determining the quantum capacity of even
rather innocent looking channels forms an elusive problem (see e.g. [68] and references therin). For example, even
for the depolarizing channel which either outputs the original state with some probability r, or otherwise replaces it
with the fully mixed state, mere bounds on the quantum capacity are known. Since a strong converse implies a sharp
bound for information transmission, the existence of a strong converse for rates R above a certain threshold places a
bound on the capacity. Hence, it is not surprising that determining the strong converse parameter for a channel N
when sending information at a rate R poses a challenge. For a long time it was only known that such a parameter
exists for R > CE(N )/2, where CE(N ) is the classical entanglement assisted capacity of N . Indeed, the first further
result was obtained only very recently by showing γQ(N , R) > 0 for R > EC(N ), where EC(N ) ≥ Q→(N ) is the
entanglement cost of N , capturing aspects of how well quantum rather than classical information can be transmitted
through N [11].
2. Example: bounded storage
Yet, to get some intuition about the parameters above, let us now consider the example of bounded, noise-free,
storage. The quantum capacity of the one qubit identity channel N = I2 is simply Q→(I2) = 1. A strong converse is
easy to obtain [11]. For completeness, we here provide a simple argument with slightly better parameters in the case
of classical forward communication.
Lemma V.3. The strong converse parameter of the one qubit identity channel obeys γQ(I2, R) = R− 1 > 0.
Proof. Consider a decomposition of the encoding and decoding map in terms of their Kraus operators as E(ρ) =∑
j EjρE
†
j and D(ρ) =
∑
k,m Dˆk,mρDˆ
†
k,m where Dˆk,m = Dk,m⊗|m〉〈m|. Note that wlog the latter has this form since
it is processing classical forward communication on M . Let Πk,m denote the projector onto the subspace that Dˆk,m
maps to. We can now bound
Fc(D ◦ (I⊗N2 ⊗ IM ) ◦ E) =
∑
jkm
∣∣∣∣tr [Dˆk,mEj ( I2NR
)]∣∣∣∣2 (72)
≤
∑
jkm
tr
[
Dˆk,mEj
(
I
2NR
)
E†j Dˆ
†
k,m
]
tr
[
Πk,m
(
I
2NR
)]
(73)
≤ 2−(R−1)N tr
[
D ◦ E
(
I
2NR
)]
(74)
= 2−(R−1)N , (75)
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where the first equality is a standard rewriting [66], the second is given by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, and the
last equality is given by the fact that D and E are trace preserving.
Plugging this strong converse parameter into Theorem V.1 and noting that R = 1/ν we obtain the following.
Corollary V.4. Let Bob’s storage device be of the form F = I⊗νn2 with ν < log(3) − 1 ≈ 0.585. For any choice of
constant parameters ε, δ′ > 0, Protocol 1 implements (n, λ, ε, 1/3)-WSE with
λ = (log(3)− 1)− ν − 1
n
(κ+ ξ + 1) , (76)
where κ = log
(
2/δ′2 + 1
)
and ξ = log
(
1/
(
ε2/2− δ′)2).
We note that for the case of bounded storage in an independent and identically distributed asymptotic setting, that
is F = I⊗νn2 with n → ∞, the parameters obtained here are slightly worse than what was obtained in [63], where
security was shown to be possible for ν < 2/3 instead of ν . 0.585. This is due to the fact that the lower bound
0.585 in our uncertainty relation stems from an expression involving the collision entropy (see Appendix A 1 for the
definition) rather than the Shannon entropy. We emphasize however, that due to finite size effects our bound is still
better in the practically relevant regime of n . 106 (for the same security parameters).
VI. DISCUSSION AND OUTLOOK
Motivated by the problem of using physical resources to extract true classical randomness, we introduced the concept
of quantum-to-classical randomness extractors. We emphasize that these QC-extractors also work against quantum
side information. We showed that for a QC-extractor to distill randomness from a quantum state ρAE , the relevant
quantity to bound is the conditional min-entropy Hmin(A|E)ρ. This is in formal analogy with classical-to-classical
extractors, in which case the relevant quantity is Hmin(X|E)ρ.
We proceeded by showing various properties of QC-extractors and giving several examples for QC-extractors. In this
context, it is illustrative to compare our results about QC-extractors with CC-extractors (holding against quantum
side information as well). This is done in Table II.
CC-extractors QC-extractors
Seed
Lower bound log(n− k) + 2 log(1/ε) [71] log(1/ε)
Upper bounds
log(n− k) + 2 log(1/ε) (NE) m+ logn+ 4 log(1/ε) [Th III.5] (NE)
c · log(n/ε) [40] 3n [Th III.8]
Output
Upper bound k − 2 log(1/ε) [71] n+H
√
ε
min(A|E) [Pr III.6]
Lower bound k − 2 log(1/ε) [49, 75, 86] n+ k − 2 log(1/ε) [Th III.8]
TABLE II: Known bounds on the seed size and output size in terms of (qu)bits for different kinds of (k, ε)-randomness extractors.
n refers to the number of input (qu)bits, m the number of output (qu)bits and k the min-entropy of the input Hmin(A|E).
Note that for QC-extractors, k can be as small as −n. Additive absolute constants are omitted. The symbol (NE) denotes
non-explicit constructions.
It is eye-catching that there is a vast difference between the upper and lower bounds for the seed size of QC-
extractors. We were only able to show the existence of QC-extractors with seed length roughly the output size m,
but we believe that it should be possible to find QC-extractors with much smaller seeds, say O(polylog(n)) bits long,
where n is the input size. However, completely different techniques might be needed to address this question.
It is interesting to note that our results do indeed lend further justification to use Bell tests to certify randomness
created by measuring a quantum system [2, 20, 21, 69]. Note that for a tripartite pure state ρABE where we want
to create classical randomness by means of QC-extractors on A, we have to find a lower bound on Hmin(A|E)ρ. But
by the duality relation for min/max-entropies we have Hmin(A|B)ρ = −Hmax(A|B)ρ [84], where the latter denotes
the max-entropy as introduced [56]. Since Hmax(A|B)ρ is again a measure for the entanglement between A and B,
one basically only has to do entanglement witnessing (e.g., Bell tests consuming part of the state) to ensure that
the QC-extractor method can work (i.e. that Hmin(A|E)ρ is large enough). Note that any method to certify such an
estimate would do and we could also use different measurements during the estimation process and the final extraction
step. It would be interesting to know, if by using a particular QC-extractor, one can gain more randomness than
in [2, 20, 21, 69]. In [2], it was also remarked that if we want to extract randomness from A and B, then it is not
25
necessary for the joint state across A and B to be maximally entangled. Note that this is indeed intuitive as the
amount of extractable randomness in this case is determined by Hmin(AB|E) together.
As the first application, we showed that every QC-extractor gives rise to entropic uncertainty relations with quantum
side information for the von Neumann (Shannon) entropy and the min-entropy. Here the seed size translates into the
number of measurements in the uncertainty relation. Since it is in general difficult to obtain uncertainty relations for
a small set of measurements (except for the special case of two), finding QC-extractors with a small seed size is also
worth pursuing from the point of view of uncertainty relations.
As the second application, we used the bitwise QC-extractor from Section III C to show that the security in the
noisy storage model can be related to the strong converse rate of the quantum storage; a problem that attracted
quite some attention over the last few years. Here one can also see the usefulness of bitwise QC-extractors for
quantum cryptography. Indeed, any bitwise QC-extractor would yield a protocol for weak string erasure. Bitwise
measurements have a very simple structure, and hence are implementable with current technology. In that respect, it
would be interesting to see if a similar QC-extractor can also be proven for only two (complementary) measurements
per qubit. This would give a protocol for weak string erasure using BB84 bases as in [58].
We expect that QC-extractors will have many more applications in quantum cryptography, e.g., quantum key
distribution. One possible interesting application could be to prove the security of oblivious transfer when purifying
the protocol of [58]. Yet, it would require additional concepts of ‘entanglement sampling’ which still elude us.
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Appendix A: Properties of Smooth Entropy Measures
1. Collision entropy and alternative smooth entropies
For technical reasons, we need some more entropic quantities. We start with the quantum conditional collision
entropy. For a state ρAB ∈ S(AB) relative to a state σB ∈ S(B), it is defined as
H2(A|B)ρ|σ = − log tr
[
(IA ⊗ σ−1/4B )ρAB(IA ⊗ σ−1/4B )
]2
, (A1)
where the inverses are generalized inverses.15 Next we introduce the following alternative smooth conditional min-
entropy. For a state ρAB ∈ S(AB) it is defined as
Hεmin(A|B)ρ|ρ = max
ρ˜AB∈Bε(ρAB)
Hmin(A|B)ρ˜|ρ˜ . (A2)
We will also need the conditional max-entropy
Hmax(A|B)ρ = max
σB∈S(B)
logF (ρAB , IA ⊗ σB)2 , (A3)
and its smooth version
Hεmax(A|B)ρ = min
ρ˜AB∈Bε(ρAB)
Hmax(A|B)ρ˜ . (A4)
The following lemma relates the collision and the min-entropy.
15 For MA ∈ L(A), M−1A is a generalized inverse of MA if MAM−1A = M−1A MA = supp(MA) = supp(M−1A ), where supp(.) denotes the
support.
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Lemma A.1. Let ρAB ∈ S≤(AB) and σB ∈ S(B) with supp(ρAB) ⊆ IA ⊗ supp(σB), where supp(.) denotes the
support. Then
Hmin(A|B)ρ|σ ≤ H2(A|B)ρ|σ . (A5)
Proof. We have supp(ρAB) ⊆ IA ⊗ supp(ρB) and hence by [13, Lemma B.2]
Hmin(A|B)ρ|σ = − log max
ωAB∈S(AB)
tr
[
ωAB
(
IA ⊗ σ−1/2B
)
ρAB
(
IA ⊗ σ−1/2B
)]
, (A6)
where the inverses are generalized inverses. But for ρˆAB =
ρAB
tr[ρAB ]
∈ S(AB) we have,
H2(A|B)ρ|σ = − log tr
[
ρAB
(
IA ⊗ σ−1/2B
)
ρAB
(
IA ⊗ σ−1/2B
)]
(A7)
= − log tr [ρAB ]− log tr
[
ρˆAB
(
IA ⊗ σ−1/2B
)
ρAB
(
IA ⊗ σ−1/2B
)]
(A8)
≥ − log max
ωAB∈S(AB)
tr
[
ωAB
(
IA ⊗ σ−1/2B
)
ρAB
(
IA ⊗ σ−1/2B
)]
= Hmin(A|B)ρ|σ . (A9)
Finally, we also need a relation between the standard min-entropy, and the alternative definition from above.
Lemma A.2. [86, Lemma 18] Let ε′ ≥ 0, ε′ > 0, and ρAB ∈ S(AB). Then
Hεmin(A|B)ρ − log
(
2
ε′2
+
1
1− ε
)
≤ Hε+ε′min (A|B)ρ|ρ ≤ Hε+ε
′
min (A|B)ρ . (A10)
2. Chain Rules
The smooth conditional min- and max-entropy fulfill a duality relation.
Lemma A.3. [84] Let ρAB ∈ S(AB), ε ≥ 0, and ρABC be an arbitrary purification of ρAB. Then
Hεmax(A|B)ρ = −Hεmin(A|C)ρ . (A11)
The following shows that the min-entropy can not increase too much by a measurement on the first system.
Lemma A.4. Let ρAB ∈ S(AB), ε ≥ 0, and {Px}|X|x=1 be a projective rank-one measurement on A. Then
Hεmin(X|B)ρ ≤ Hεmin(A|B)ρ + log |X| . (A12)
Proof. Let VA→XX′ be an isometric purification of {Px} and ρXX′BB′ a purification of ρXX′B = V ρABV †. By the
invariance of the min-entropy under local isometries [84, Lemma 13] and the duality between the min- and max-entropy
(Lemma A.3), the proposition becomes equivalent to
Hεmax(XX
′|B′)ρ ≤ Hεmax(X|X ′B′)ρ + log |X| . (A13)
For ρˆXX′B′ ∈ Bε(ρXX′B′) and σˆX′B′ ∈ S(X ′B′) such that
Hεmax(X|X ′B′)ρ = logF (ρˆXX′B , IX ⊗ σˆX′B′)2 , (A14)
as well as ρ¯XX′B′ ∈ Bε(ρXX′B′) and σ¯B ∈ S(B) such that
Hεmax(XX
′|B′)ρ = logF (ρ¯XX′B , IXX′ ⊗ σ¯B′)2 , (A15)
the claim follows by the definition of the max-entropy (Equation (A3)-(A4)) together with the observation
Hεmax(XX
′|B′)ρ ≤ log
(
|X| · F (ρˆXX′B′ , IX ⊗ IX
′
|X| ⊗ σ¯B′)
2
)
≤ logF (ρˆXX′B′ , IX ⊗ σˆX′B′)2 + log |X| . (A16)
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3. Asymptotic behavior
The von Neumann entropy can be seen as a special case of the smooth min-entropy. The underlying technical
statement that makes this precise, is the asymptotic equipartition property (AEP) for the smooth conditional min-
entropy.
Lemma A.5. [83, Remark 10] Let ρAB ∈ S(AB), ε > 0, and n ≥ 2
(
1− ε2). Then,
1
n
Hεmin(A|B)ρ⊗n|ρ⊗n ≥ H(A|B)ρ −
4
√
1− 2 log ε
(
2 + log |A|2
)
√
n
. (A17)
Appendix B: Technical Lemmata
Throughout, we will need a number of technical results and definitions, summarized here for convenience. In
the following we state all results in our own notation and only as general as we need them (which may result in
a simplification compared to the given references). We start with a general decoupling result about exact unitary
2-designs.
Lemma B.1. [32, Theorem 3.7] Let A = A1A2, and consider the map TA→A1 as defined in Equation (7). Then, if
{U1, . . . , UL} defines an exact unitary 2-design (Definition III.3), we have for δ ≥ 0,
1
L
L∑
i=1
∥∥∥∥TA→A1(UiρAEU†i )− IA1|A1| ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
≤
√
|A1|
|A| 2
−Hδmin(A|E)ρ + 2δ . (B1)
The full set of MUBs generates a complex projective 2-design.
Lemma B.2. [54] Let
{
U1, . . . , U|A|+1
}
define a full set of mutually unbiased bases of A. Then
1
|A|(|A|+ 1)
|A|+1∑
i=1
∑
a∈[d]
(Ui|a〉〈a|U†i )⊗2 =
2Πsym
|A|(|A|+ 1) , (B2)
where Πsym is the projector onto the symmetric subspace spanned by the vectors |aa′〉+ |a′a〉 for a, a′ ∈ [A] .
The following well known ‘swap trick’ is used to prove decoupling statements.
Lemma B.3. Let M,N ∈ L(A). Then,
tr[MN ] = tr[(M ⊗N)F ], (B3)
where F =
∑
aa′ |aa′〉〈a′a| is the swap operator.
The following is called operator Chernoff bound.
Lemma B.4. [3, Theorem 19] Let X1, . . . , XL be iid random variables and 0 ≤ Xi ≤ I, E {Xi} = Γ ≥ αI. Then
Pr
{
1
L
L∑
i=1
Xi ≤ (1 + η)Γ
}
≥ 1− d exp
(
−Lη
2α
2 ln 2
)
. (B4)
Appendix C: Proofs of QC-Extractors
In this section, we provide the full proofs of our claims regarding QC-extractors. In the proofs we need the Hilbert-
Schmidt norm, given by ‖ρ‖2 =
√
tr [ρ†ρ].
Theorem III.5. Let A = A1A2 with n = log |A| and TA→A1 be the measurement map defined in Equation (7). Let
ε > 0, c be a sufficiently large constant, and
log |A1| ≤ n+ k − 4 log(1/ε)− c as well as logL ≥ log |A1|+ log n+ 4 log(1/ε) + c . (C1)
Then, choosing L unitaries {U1, . . . , UL} independently according to the Haar measure defines a (k, ε)-QC-extractor
with high probability (see Equation (C20) for a precise bound).
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Proof. We use one-shot decoupling techniques as developed in [10, 32, 33, 80, 81]. Let U be a unitary on A. Using
the Hoelder-type inequality (see e.g. [15])
‖αβγ‖1 ≤ ‖|α|r‖1/r1 ‖|β|s‖1/s1 ‖|γ|t‖1/t1 (C2)
with r = t = 4, s = 2, and α = γ = (IA1 ⊗ ρE)1/4, β = (IA1 ⊗ ρE)−1/4
(
T (UρAEU†)− IA1|A1| ⊗ ρE
)
(IA1 ⊗ ρE)−1/4, we
get that16∥∥∥∥T (UρAEU†)− IA1|A1| ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
≤ |A1|1/4
√
tr
[
(IA1 ⊗ ρE)−1/4
(
T (UρAEU†)− IA1|A1| ⊗ ρE
)
(IA1 ⊗ ρE)−1/4
]2
|A1|1/4
(C3)
= |A1|1/2
∥∥∥∥(IA1 ⊗ ρE)−1/4(T (UρAEU†)− IA1|A1| ⊗ ρE
)
(IA1 ⊗ ρE)−1/4
∥∥∥∥
2
(C4)
= |A1|1/2
∥∥∥∥T (Uρ˜AEU†)− IA1|A1| ⊗ ρ˜E
∥∥∥∥
2
, (C5)
where ρ˜AE = (IA ⊗ ρE)−1/4ρAE(IA ⊗ ρE)−1/4. Together with the concavity of the square root function, this implies
1
L
L∑
i=1
∥∥∥∥T (UiρAEU†i )− IA1|A1| ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
≤
√√√√ 1
L
L∑
i=1
∥∥∥∥T (UiρAEU†i )− IA1|A1| ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥2
1
(C6)
≤
√√√√|A1| 1
L
L∑
i=1
∥∥∥∥T (Uiρ˜AEU†i )− IA1|A1| ⊗ ρ˜E
∥∥∥∥2
2
(C7)
=
√√√√|A1| 1
L
L∑
i=1
tr
[
T
(
Uiρ˜AEU
†
i
)
− IA1|A1| ⊗ ρ˜E
]2
. (C8)
We continue with
1
L
L∑
i=1
tr
[
T
(
Uiρ˜AEU
†
i
)
− IA1|A1| ⊗ ρ˜E
]2
(C9)
=
1
L
L∑
i=1
tr
[
T
(
Uiρ˜AEU
†
i
)]2
− 2 tr
[
T
(
Uiρ˜AEU
†
i
)( IA1
|A1| ⊗ ρ˜E
)]
+ tr
[
IA1
|A1| ⊗ ρ˜E
]2
(C10)
and first compute the cross term
tr
[
T
(
Uiρ˜AEU
†
i
)( IA1
|A1| ⊗ ρ˜E
)]
=
1
|A1| tr
[
trA1
[
T
(
Uiρ˜AEU
†
i
)
(IA1 ⊗ ρ˜E)
]]
(C11)
=
1
|A1| tr
[
ρ˜2E
]
. (C12)
Going back to Equation (C10), we obtain
1
L
L∑
i=1
tr
[
T
(
Uiρ˜AEU
†
i
)
− IA1|A1| ⊗ ρ˜E
]2
=
1
L
L∑
i=1
tr
[
T
(
Uiρ˜AEU
†
i
)]2
− 1|A1| tr
[
ρ˜2E
]
. (C13)
16 The inverses are generalized inverses.
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We now compute the first term using the ‘swap trick’ (Lemma B.3)
tr
[T (Uρ˜AEU†)]2 = tr[∑
a1a2
〈a1a2|Uρ˜AEU†|a1a2〉|a1〉〈a1|
]2
(C14)
= tr
 ∑
a1a2a′1a
′
2
〈a1a2a′1a′2|U⊗2ρ˜⊗2AE(U⊗2)†|a1a2a′1a′2〉|a1a′1〉〈a1a′1|
(
FA1A′1 ⊗ FEE′
) (C15)
=
∑
a1a2a′1a
′
2
tr
[
ρ˜⊗2AE(U
⊗2)†|a1a2a′1a′2〉〈a1a′1|
(
FA1A′1 ⊗ FEE′
) |a1a′1〉〈a1a2a′1a′2|U⊗2] . (C16)
Taking the average over the set {U1, . . . , UL}, we get
1
L
L∑
i=1
tr
[
T
(
Uiρ˜AEU
†
i
)]2
=
∑
a1a2a′1a
′
2
tr
[
ρ˜⊗2AE
1
L
L∑
i=1
{(
U⊗2i
)† |a1a2a′1a′2〉〈a1a′1|FA1A′1 |a1a′1〉〈a1a2a′1a′2|U⊗2i }⊗ FEE′
]
(C17)
= tr
ρ˜⊗2AE 1L
L∑
i=1
(U†i )⊗2 ∑
a1a2a′2,a
′
1=a1
|a1a2a′1a′2〉〈a1a2a′1a′2|U⊗2i
⊗ FEE′
 . (C18)
Using for example [33, Lemma 3.4], if U is distributed according to the Haar measure on the group of unitaries acting
on A, then
EU
(U†)⊗2 ∑
a1a2a′2
|a1a2a1a′2〉〈a1a2a1a′2|U⊗2
 =
( |A||A2| − 1
|A|2 − 1
)
IAA′ +
|A| − |A2|
|A|2 − 1 FAA′ ≡ ΓAA′ . (C19)
Now we note that |A||A2|−1|A|2−1 ≥ 12|A1| , and apply an operator Chernoff bound (Lemma B.4) to get
Pr
 1L
L∑
i=1
(U†i )
⊗2 ∑
a1a2a′2
|a1a2a1a′2〉〈a1a2a1a′2|U⊗2i ≤ (1 + η)Γ
 ≥ 1− |A| exp
(
− Lη
2
|A1|4 ln 2
)
. (C20)
This shows that if L ≥ 2 · 4 ln 2 · |A1| log |A|/η2, the unitaries U1, . . . , UL satisfy the above operator inequality with
high probability. In the rest of the proof, we show that such unitaries define QC-extractors. Putting these unitaries
in Equation (C18), we get
1
L
L∑
i=1
tr
[
T
(
Uiρ˜AE (Ui)
†
)]2
≤ (1 + η)
( |A||A2| − 1
|A|2 − 1 tr
[
ρ˜2E
]
+
|A| − |A2|
|A|2 − 1 tr
[
ρ˜2AE
])
. (C21)
Plugging this expression in Equation (C13) and then in Equation (C8), we get
1
L
L∑
i=1
∥∥∥∥T (UiρAE (Ui)†)− IA1|A1| ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
≤
√
(1 + η)
( |A|2 − |A1|
|A|2 − 1
)
tr [ρ˜2E ] + (1 + η)
( |A1||A| − |A|
|A|2 − 1
)
tr [ρ˜2AE ]− tr [ρ˜2E ]
(C22)
≤
√
η + (1 + η)
|A1|
|A|+ 1 tr [ρ˜
2
AE ] , (C23)
since tr
[
ρ˜2E
]
= tr
[
trA
[(
IA ⊗ ρ−1/4E
)
ρAE
(
IA ⊗ ρ−1/4E
)]2]
= tr [ρE ] = 1. By the definition of the conditional collision
entropy (Equation (A1)) and Lemma A.1, it follows that,
1
L
L∑
i=1
∥∥∥∥T (UiρAE (Ui)†)− IA1|A1| ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
≤
√
η + (1 + η)
|A1|
|A|+ 12
−H2(A|E)ρ|ρ (C24)
≤
√
η + (1 + η)
|A1|
|A|+ 12
−Hmin(A|E)ρ|ρ . (C25)
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Now let ρ′AE ∈ Bδ+δ
′
(ρAE) be such that H
δ+δ′
min (A|E)ρ|ρ = Hmin(A|E)ρ′|ρ′ . Since we have ‖ρ′AE − ρAE‖1 ≤ 2(δ + δ′)
(by Equation (11)), we know that by the (reverse) triangle inequality and the monotonicity of the trace distance,∣∣∣∣‖T (UρAEU†)− IA1|A1| ⊗ ρE‖1 − ‖T (Uρ′AEU†)− IA1|A1| ⊗ ρE‖1
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ‖T (UρAEU†)− T (Uρ′AEU†)‖1 (C26)
≤ ‖ρ′AE − ρAE‖1 ≤ 2(δ + δ′) , (C27)
and hence applying (C25) to ρ′AB , we get
1
L
L∑
i=1
∥∥∥∥T (UiρAE (Ui)†)− IA1|A1| ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
≤
√
η + (1 + η)
|A1|
|A|+ 12
−Hδ+δ′min (A|E)ρ|ρ + 2(δ + δ′) . (C28)
We then use Lemma A.2 about the equivalence of the different conditional min-entropies to get
1
L
L∑
i=1
∥∥∥∥T (UiρAE (Ui)†)− IA1|A1| ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
≤
√
η + (1 + η)
|A1|
|A|+ 12
−Hδmin(A|E)ρ+z + 2(δ + δ′) , (C29)
with z = log(2/δ′2 + 1/(1− δ)). Setting η = ε2/4, δ = 0, δ′ = ε/4, and assuming log |A1| ≤ n+ k− 4 log(1/ε)− c with
k = Hmin(A|E)ρ, we get for large enough c√
η + (1 + η)
|A1|
|A|+ 12
−Hmin(A|E)ρ+z + δ′ ≤ ε/2 +
√
ε2/4 + 2 · 2k−4 log(1/ε)−c−k+log(8/ε2+1) (C30)
≤ ε/2 +
√
ε2/4 + ε2 · 21−c+4 ≤ ε . (C31)
Theorem III.8. Let A = A1A2 with n = log |A|, |A| a prime power, and consider the map TA→A1 as defined in
Equation (7). Then, if
{
U1, . . . , U|A|+1
}
defines a full set of mutually unbiased bases, we have for δ ≥ 0,
1
|P|
1
|A|+ 1
∑
P∈P
|A|+1∑
i=1
∥∥∥∥TA→A1 (PUiρAE (PUi)†)− IA1|A1| ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
≤
√
|A1|
|A|+ 12
−Hδmin(A|E)ρ + 2δ , (C32)
where P is a set of pair-wise independent permutation matrices. In particular, the set {PUi : P ∈ P, i ∈ [|A| + 1]}
defines a (k, ε)-QC-extractor provided
log |A1| ≤ n+ k − 2 log(1/ε) , (C33)
and the number of unitaries is
L = (|A|+ 1)|P| = (|A|+ 1)|A|(|A| − 1) . (C34)
Proof. Let σE ∈ S(E). Similarly as in the proof of Theorem III.5, but with the difference that now ρ˜AE =
(IA ⊗ σE)−1/4 ρAB (IA ⊗ σE)−1/4, we get
1
|P|
1
|A|+ 1
∑
P∈P
|A|+1∑
i=1
∥∥∥∥T (PUiρAE (PUi)†)− IA1A1 ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
≡ EP,i
{∥∥∥∥T (PUiρAE (PUi)†)− IA1A1 ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
}
(C35)
≤
√√√√|A1| ∑
a1a2a′2
tr
[
ρ˜⊗2AEEP,i
{(
U†i P †
)⊗2
|a1a2a1a′2〉〈a1a2a1a′2| (PUi)⊗2
}
⊗ FEE′
]
− tr [ρ˜2E ] . (C36)
We handle the case a2 = a
′
2 and the case a2 6= a′2 differently. When a2 = a′2, we have (U†i )⊗2|aa〉〈aa|U⊗2i =
(U†i |a〉〈a|Ui)⊗2, where a = P−1(a1a2). As {U1, . . . , U|A|+1} form a full set of mutually unbiased bases, the vectors
{Ui|a〉}i,a define a complex projective 2-design (Lemma B.2), and we get∑
a1a2,a′2=a2
EP,i
{(
U†i P
†
)⊗2
|a1a2a1a′2〉〈a1a2a1a′2| (PU)⊗2
}
=
∑
a
Ei
{(
U†i
)⊗2
|aa〉〈aa|U⊗2i
}
(C37)
= |A| 2Π
sym
AA′
(|A|+ 1)|A| =
IAA′ + FAA′
|A|+ 1 . (C38)
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We now consider a2 6= a′2 and use the fact that the permutations are chosen to be pairwise independent. Similar
techniques were used in the context of decoupling in [80]. We have
EP
{(
P †
)⊗2 |a1a2a1a′2〉〈a1a2a1a′2|P⊗2} = EP {|P−1(a1a2)〉〈P−1(a1a2)| ⊗ |P−1(a1a′2)〉〈P−1(a1a′2)|} (C39)
=
∑
a 6=a′
PrP
{
P−1(a1a2) = a, P−1(a1a′2) = a
′} |a〉〈a| ⊗ |a′〉〈a′| (C40)
=
1
|A|(|A| − 1)
∑
a6=a′
|a〉〈a| ⊗ |a′〉〈a′| (C41)
=
IAA′
|A|(|A| − 1) −
1
|A|(|A| − 1)
∑
a
|aa〉〈aa| . (C42)
Going back to Equation (C38), we get together with Equation (C42) that for any a2 6= a′2,
EP,i
{(
U†i
)⊗2 (
P †
)⊗2 |a1a2a1a′2〉〈a1a2a1a′2|P⊗2U⊗2i } = IAA′|A|(|A| − 1) − 1|A|(|A| − 1) ∑
a
Ei
{(
U†i
)⊗2
|aa〉〈aa|U⊗2i
}
(C43)
=
IAA′
|A| (|A| − 1) −
IAA′ + FAA′
|A|(|A| − 1)(|A|+ 1) (C44)
=
|A|IAA′ − FAA′
|A|(|A|2 − 1) . (C45)
This being true for all a1, a2, a
′
2, it follows with Equation (C36) that,
EP,i
{∥∥∥∥T (PUiρAE (PUi)†)− IA1A1 ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
}
(C46)
=
√
|A1| tr
[
ρ˜⊗2AE
(
IAA′ + FAA′
|A|+ 1 + |A|(|A2| − 1)
|A|IAA′ − FAA′
|A|(|A|2 − 1)
)
⊗ FEE′
]
− tr [ρ˜2E ] (C47)
=
√
|A1|
(
1
|A|+ 1 +
|A|(|A2| − 1)
|A|2 − 1
)
tr
[
ρ˜⊗2AE (IAA′ ⊗ FEE′)
]
+ |A1|
(
1
|A|+ 1 −
|A2| − 1
|A|2 − 1
)
tr
[
ρ˜⊗2AE (FAA′ ⊗ FEE′)
]− tr [ρ˜2E ]
(C48)
=
√
|A1| |A||A2| − 1|A|2 − 1 tr
[
trAA′
[
ρ˜⊗2AE (IAA′ ⊗ FEE′)
]]
+ |A1|
( |A| − |A2|
|A|2 − 1
)
tr[ρ˜2AE ]− tr [ρ˜2E ] (C49)
=
√( |A|2 − |A1|
|A|2 − 1 − 1
)
tr[ρ˜2E ] +
( |A1||A| − |A|
|A|2 − 1
)
tr[ρ˜2AE ] ≤
√
|A1|
|A|+ 1 tr [ρ˜
2
AE ] =
√
|A1|
|A|+ 12
−H2(A|E)ρ|σ , (C50)
where we used the definition of the conditional collision entropy (Equation (A1)) in the last step. Now, by choosing
σE appropriately, and an analogue argumentation as at the very end of the proof of Theorem III.5, we conclude that,
EP,i
{∥∥∥∥T (PUiρAE (PUi)†)− IA1A1 ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
}
≤
√
|A1|
|A|+ 12
−Hδmin(A|E)ρ + 2δ . (C51)
Theorem III.9. Let A = A1A2 with |A| = dn, |A1| = dξn, |A2| = d(1−ξ)n, and d a prime power. Consider the map
TA→A1 as defined in Equation (7). Then for δ ≥ 0 and δ′ > 0,
1
|P|
1
(d+ 1)n
∑
P∈P
∑
V ∈Vd,n
∥∥∥∥TA→A1 (PV ρAE (PV )†)− IA1|A1| ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
(C52)
≤
√
2(1−log(d+1)+ξ log d)n(1 + 2−Hδmin(A|E)ρ+z) + 2(δ + δ′) , (C53)
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where Vd,n is defined as above, P is a set of pair-wise independent permutation matrices, and z = log
(
2
δ′2 +
1
1−δ
)
.
In particular, the set {PV : P ∈ P, V ∈ Vd,n} is a (k, ε)-extractor provided
log |A1| ≤ (log(d+ 1)− 1)n+ min {0, k} − 4 log(1/ε)− 7 (C54)
and the number of unitaries is
L = (d+ 1)ndn(dn − 1) . (C55)
Proof. We use the same strategy as in the proofs of Theorem III.5 and Theorem III.8; here again with ρ˜AE =
(IA ⊗ ρE)−1/4 ρAE (IA ⊗ ρE)−1/4. We get
1
|P|
1
(d+ 1)n
∑
P∈P,V ∈Vd,n
∥∥∥∥T (PV ρAE (PV )†)− IA1|A1| ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
≡ EP,V
{∥∥∥∥T (PV ρAE (PV )†)− IA1|A1| ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
}
≤
√√√√|A1| tr[ρ˜⊗2AE
(∑
a
EV
{
(V †|a〉〈a|V )⊗2
}
+ |A| (|A2| − 1) IAA
′
|A| (|A| − 1)
)
⊗ FEE′
]
− tr [ρ˜2E ] . (C56)
We calculate
EV
{(
V †|a〉〈a|V )⊗2} = 1
(d+ 1)n
∑
a1,a2,...,an
∑
V1,...,Vn
⊗
i
(
(V †i |ai〉〈ai|Vi)⊗2
)
=
1
(d+ 1)n
⊗
i
∑
ai,Vi
V †i |ai〉〈ai|Vi
⊗2 .
(C57)
As {V0, . . . , Vd} form a maximal set of mutually unbiased bases in dimension d, and with this form a complex projective
2-design (Lemma B.2), we have ∑
a∈{0,...,d},V ∈Vd,1
(
V †|a〉〈a|V )⊗2 = 2Πsym . (C58)
Furthermore (ΠsymB )
⊗n ≤ ΠsymB⊗n for any quantum system B, and hence we obtain
1
(d+ 1)n
⊗
i
∑
ai,Vi
V †i |ai〉〈ai|Vi
⊗2 ≤ ( 2
d+ 1
)n
ΠsymAA′ =
(
2
d+ 1
)n IAA′ + FAA′
2
. (C59)
Together with Equation (C56) and Equation (C57), we get
EP,V
{∥∥∥∥T (PV ρAE (PV )†)− IA1|A1| ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
}
(C60)
≤
√
|A1| tr
[
ρ˜⊗2AE
((
2
d+ 1
)n IAA′ + FAA′
2
+ |A|(|A2| − 1) IAA
′
|A|(|A| − 1)
)
⊗ FEE′
]
− tr [ρ˜2E ] (C61)
=
√( |A| − |A1|
|A| − 1 +
|A1|
2
(
2
d+ 1
)n)
tr
[
ρ˜⊗2AE (IAA′ ⊗ FEE′)
]
+
|A1|
2
(
2
d+ 1
)n
tr
[
ρ˜⊗2AE (FAA′ ⊗ FEE′)
]− tr [ρ˜2E ]
(C62)
≤
√(
1 + 2(1−log(d+1)+ξ log d)n
)
tr
[
trAA′
[
ρ˜⊗2AE (IAA′ ⊗ FE)
]]
+ 2(1−log(d+1)+ξ log d)n tr[ρ˜2AE ]− tr [ρ˜2E ] (C63)
=
√
2(1−log(d+1)+ξ log d)n tr [ρ˜2E ] + 2(1−log(d+1)+ξ log d)n tr [ρ˜
2
AE ] (C64)
=
√
2(1−log(d+1)+ξ log d)n
(
1 + 2−H2(A|E)ρ|ρ
)
, (C65)
where we used the definition of the conditional collision entropy (Equation (A1)) in the last step. Now, by an analogue
argumentation as at the very end of the proof of Theorem III.5, we conclude that,
EP,V
{∥∥∥∥T (PV ρAE (PV )†)− IA1|A1| ⊗ ρE
∥∥∥∥
1
}
≤
√
2(1−log(d+1)+ξ log d)n(1 + 2−Hδmin(A|E)ρ+z) + 2(δ + δ′) . (C66)
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Setting δ = 0 and δ′ = ε/4, we conclude that the set {PV : P ∈ P, V ∈ Vd,n} is a (k, ε)-QC-extractor provided
log |A1| = n · ξ log d ≤ (log(d+ 1)− 1)n− log(1 + 2−k+log(8/ε2+1)) + log((ε/2)2) (C67)
≤ (log(d+ 1)− 1)n+ min{0, k − log(8/ε2 + 1)}− 1− 2 log(1/ε)− 2 (C68)
≤ (log(d+ 1)− 1)n+ min {0, k} − 4 log(1/ε)− 7. (C69)
Note that step (C61) is indeed striking when we consider the case of trivial side information. Effectively, one of
the terms we wish to bound then is tr
[
ρ⊗2A M
]
where M is given by the l.h.s. of (C59). This, however, is exactly
what one bounds when proving entropic uncertainty relations for MUBs [6], or more generally anti-commuting mea-
surements [92]. And indeed, in the case with quantum side information, our techniques also allow to directly derive
entropic uncertainty relations with quantum side information in terms of the quantum conditional collision entropy
(as defined in Equation (A1)) using the fact that MUBs form a complex projective 2-design. However, we are more
interested in relations in terms of the min-entropy (see Section IV). On the other hand, it is an interesting question
whether the techniques from [92] can be extended to give a better bound than the (probably too general) eigenvalue
bound of (C59).
Appendix D: Proofs of Uncertainty Relations
In this section, we provide the full proofs regarding our claims of entropic uncertainty relations.
Proposition IV.4. Let d ≥ 2 be a prime power, and {V0, V1, . . . , Vd} define a complete set of MUBs of Cd. Consider
the set of measurements {MjA→K : j ∈ [(d + 1)n]} on the n qudit space A defined by the unitary transformations{V = Vu1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Vun |ui ∈ {0, . . . , d}}. Then for all ρAE ∈ S(AE), we have
1
(d+ 1)n
(d+1)n∑
j=1
H(K|E)ρj ≥ n · (log(d+ 1)− 1) + min {0, H(A|E)ρ} , (D1)
where ρj =MjA→K(ρ).
Proof. Using the QC-extractor for the single-qudit MUB case as discussed in Section III C, we get with the same
reasoning as before that for ε > 0, δ ≥ 0,
1
L
L∑
j=1
H(K|E)ρj ≥ (1− ε)
(
n (log(d+ 1)− 1)− log
(
1 + 2−H
δ
min(A|E)ρ|ρ
)
− log
(
1
(ε− 2δ)2
))
− 2h(ε)
≥ (1− ε)
(
n (log(d+ 1)− 1) + min{0, Hδmin(A|E)ρ|ρ}− 1− log( 1(ε− 2δ)2
))
− 2h(ε) . (D2)
Here we use a version with Hδmin(A|E)ρ|ρ instead of Hδmin(A|E)ρ, but this is immediate from the proof of Theorem III.9.
Evaluating Equation (D2) on the m-fold tensor product of the original input system dn, and multiplying both sides
with 1/m, we obtain
1
L
L∑
j=1
H(K|E)ρj ≥ (1− ε)
(
n (log(d+ 1)− 1) + min
{
0,
1
m
Hδmin(A|E)ρ⊗m|ρ⊗m
})
(D3)
− 1− ε
m
(
1− log
(
1
(ε− 2δ)2
))
− 2h(ε)
m
(D4)
≥ (1− ε)
(
n (log(d+ 1)− 1) + min
{
0, H(A|E)ρ −
4
√
1− 2 log δ (2 + n2 )√
m
})
(D5)
− 1− ε
m
(
1− log
(
1
(ε− 2δ)2
))
− 2h(ε)
m
. (D6)
Here we used the fully quantum asymptotic equipartition property for the smooth conditional min-entropy
(Lemma A.5). By first letting m→∞ and then ε→ 0, we arrive at the claim.
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Appendix E: Definition Weak String Erasure
For convenience sake, we here provide a formal definition of weak string erasure [58] for p 6= 1/2 as given in [63],
where we restrict to qubits (d = 2). The definition is stated in terms of ideal states, akin to an ideal functionality
in classical cryptography. In the proof of security against dishonest Bob, we simply show that Bob’s ε-smooth min-
entropy is high. However, by (11) this implies that Bob’s real state is ε-close to an ideal state of high min-entropy
in trace distance. Note that for cryptographic purposes, we will specify distances in term of the trace distance, since
this is the relevant distance that determines how well the real protocol can be distingiushed from the ideal state [45].
In the definition below, we will need to talk about distributions over subsets I ⊆ [n], where each element of [n] has
probability p of being in I. Clearly, the probability that Bob learns a particular subset I satisfies
Pr(I) = p|I|(1− p)n−|I| (E1)
Note that we can write the subset I as a string (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ {0, 1}n where yi = 1 if and only if i ∈ I, allowing us
to identify |I〉 = |y1〉 ⊗ . . . ⊗ |yn〉. The probability distribution over subsets I ⊆ [n] can then be expressed as (see
also [58])
Ψ(p) =
∑
I⊆2[n]
p|I|(1− p)n−|I||I〉〈I| . (E2)
Furthermore, we will follow the notation of [58] and use
τS =
1
|S|
∑
s∈S
|s〉〈s| , (E3)
to denote the uniform distribution over a set S.
Definition E.1 (Non-uniform WSE). An (n, λ, ε, p)-weak string erasure scheme is a protocol between A and B
satisfying the following properties:
Correctness: If both parties are honest, then there exists an ideal state σXnIXI such that
1. The joint distribution of the n-bit string Xn and subset I is given by
σXnI = τ{0,1}n ⊗Ψ(p) , (E4)
2. The joint state ρAB created by the real protocol is equal to the ideal state: ρAB = σXnIXI where we identify
(A,B) with (Xn, IXI).
Security for Alice: If A is honest, then there exists an ideal state σXnB′ such that
1. The amount of information B′ gives Bob about Xn is limited:
1
n
Hmin(X
n|B′)σ ≥ λ (E5)
2. The joint state ρAB′ created by the real protocol is ε-close to the ideal state in trace distance, where we identify
(Xn, B′) with (A,B′).
Security for Bob: If B is honest, then there exists an ideal state σA′XˆnI where Xˆ
n ∈ {0, 1}n and I ⊆ [n] such
that
1. The random variable I is independent of A′Xˆn and distributed over 2[n] according to the probability distribution
given by (E1):
σA′XˆnI = σA′Xˆn ⊗Ψ(p) . (E6)
2. The joint state ρA′B created by the real protocol is equal to the ideal state: ρA′B = σA′(IXˆI), where we identify
(A′, B) with (A′, IXˆI).
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